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I. INTRODUCTION
The dichotomy between standards and rules has generated an
impressive body of scholarship in areas as diverse as
constitutional, 1 contract,2 labor, 3 property, 4 tort,s and criminal 6 law.
This article argues that the dichotomy-in a somewhat modified
form-helps to explain a fundamental difference in the way that U.S.
1.
See, e.g., David L. Faigman, ConstitutionalAdventures in Wonderland:
Exploring the Debate Between Rules and StandardsThrough the Looking Glass of the
FirstAmendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 829 (1993); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court
1991 Term-Foreword:The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 24
(1992). See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING INLAW AND IN LIFE (1991).
2.
See, e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstructionof ContractDoctrine,
94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985). See also Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules,
Standards,and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV.
1217 (1982); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE

L.J. 557 (1992).
3.
See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, Does Karl KlareProtestToo Much?, 44 MD.
L. REV. 1100 (1985); Karl E. Kare, JudicialDeradicalizationof the Wagner Act and the
Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978); Karl
E. Klare, Lost Opportunity:Concluding Thoughts on the Finkin Critique,44 MD. L. REV.
1111 (1985); Karl E. KIare, Traditional Labor Law Scholarship and the Crisis of
Collective BargainingLaw: A Reply to ProfessorFinkin, 44 MD. L. REV. 731 (1985).
4.
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in PropertyLaw, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 577 (1988).
5.
See, e.g., Joseph R. Grodin, Are Rules Really Better than Standards? 45
HASTINGS L.J. 569 (1994); see also Book Note, The Bureaucrats of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1993) (reviewing IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESPONSIVE REGULATION (1992)).
6.
See, e.g., Al Katz & Lee E. Teitelbaum, PINS Jurisdiction,the Vagueness
Doctrine, and the Rule of Law, 53 IND. L.J. 1 (1978); Mark Kelman, Interpretative
Constructionin the Substantive CriminalLaw, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981).
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and foreign lawyers, especially those educated in the civil law
tradition, 7 perceive codes of lawyer conduct. 8
This difference in perception is more than simply a matter of
academic interest or curiosity. In December 1998, the Services
Council of the World Trade Organization (WTO) adopted the

7.
For the purpose of this essay, "the civil law tradition" refers to a legal
tradition that "is characterized by a particular interaction in its early formative period
among Roman law, Germanic and local customs, canon law, the international law
merchant, and, later, by a distinctive response to the break with feudalism and the
rise of nation states, as well as by the specially important role it has accorded to legal
science." MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 16 (2d ed. 1994).
"Foreign lawyer" refers to a lawyer educated in the civil law tradition. The reflections
in this essay and the descriptions of the legal education, professional training, and
practice of lawyers educated in the civil law tradition are by necessity expressed at
a considerable level of abstraction. To some extent, the reflections and descriptions
apply generically. Whenever possible, I have cited to readily available Englishlanguage sources for specific examples. I also humbly acknowledge how much more
there is to learn about foreign legal cultures. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman,
Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of TransnationalLaw, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 65 (1996)
(discussing the need for more research into the social and economic ramifications of
the increasingly transnational world).
8.
"Code of lawyer conduct" refers to a statement of ethical principles
adopted by a jurisdiction's licensing authority to govern the conduct of lawyers
admitted to practice before it. As discussed in a later section, the legal profession in
most civil law countries is divided. See infra Part III.B. Unless noted otherwise,
reference to a "code of lawyer conduct" with respect to lawyers trained in the civil law
tradition will be to the code that governs the conduct of a lawyer with the right of
audience. Full-text English versions of most foreign codes of lawyer conduct do not

is the
dual translation problem (Le., how to translate a legal concept-not simply wordsexist. Even if they did exist, their value would be questionable. First, there

from one language to another). Second, there is the outsider's dilemma (te., how to
appreciate the fullness of a legal concept anchored in the tangled roots of a country's
legal history and professional culture).
The most comprehensive source for foreign codes of lawyer conduct in English is
CROSS BORDER PRACTICE COMPENDIUM (D.M. Donald-Little ed., 1991 & Supp. 1997).
It contains extended summaries of the codes of lawyer conduct and other regulatory
provisions of the member states of the European Union and the recognized observer
states. Also usefil is LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF THE RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS APPLICABLE TO THE CROSS-BORDER PRACTICE OF LAw (Edwin
Godfrey ed., 1995) [hereinafter LAw WITHOUT FRONTIERS].
Compiled under the
auspices of the International Bar Association, LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS contains a
detailed overview of the ethical regimes of selected European countries, the European
Union, Japan, Canada, and Australia. Unfortunately, it does not reproduce the exact
text of the codes or statutes discussed. Its emphasis is on the regulatory barriers to
cross-border practice that interfere with a lawyer's right to advise on the law of a
jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not licensed or to provide legal services directly to
a client in that jurisdiction. See also THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS IN THE NEW EUROPE: A
HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 85 (Alan Tyrrell & Zahd Yaqub eds., 2d ed. 1996)
[hereinafter THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS IN THE NEW EUROPE]; Roger J. Goebel, Professional
Qualification and EducationalRequirements for Law Practice in a Foreign Country:
Bridgingthe CulturalGap, 63 TUL. L. REv. 443 (1989). See generally SIDNEY M. CONE,
III, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN LEGAL SERVICES: REGULATION OF LAWYERS AND FIRMS IN
GLOBAL PRACTICE (1996).
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Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector, 9 the
purpose of which was to remove illegitimate regulatory barriers to
trade in accountancy services. The Disciplines were the result of
three years of intense study by the Working Party on Professional
Services (WPPS), which was established by the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS) to which the United States is a
signatory. The WPPS is charged with the task of examining
qualification requirements, procedures, technical standards, and
licensing requirements in the professional services sector to insure
that they are no more trade-restrictive than necessary. 10 The WPPS
is now turning its attention to the legal profession. As a first step in
its review, the WPPS has issued a background paper and posed
questions to the member states of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) designed to identify barriers
to trade in legal services rooted in the countries' regulatory and
11
ethical regimes.
Fearful that the WPPS will place too great an emphasis on the
economic barriers created by professional licensing schemes and
lawyer codes of conduct and too little on ethical values such as the
independence of the bar, conflict-free representation, and client
confidentiality, the American Bar Association (ABA), the Council of
the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union (CCBE), 12 and

9.
For the text of the Disciplines and general background information, see
WTO Adopts Disciplines on Domestic Regulation for the Accountancy Sector, M2
Presswire, 1998 WL 24914185 (Dec. 16, 1998). See also Daniel Pruzin, 1TO Services
CouncilReaches Deal on Accounting Standards, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 2143 (Dec.
23, 1998).
See generally World Trade Organization (visited Aug. 2, 1999)
<http://www.wto.org.>.
10.
See Laurel S. Terry, A Case Study of the Hybrid Modelfor Facilitat5 r Cross-

Border Legal Practice:The Argument Between the American Bar Association and the
Brussels Bar,21 FORDHAM INTIL L.J. 1382, 1396 (1998) [hereinafter A Case Study].
11.
See Legal Services: Background Note by the Secretariat,Council for Trade
in Services, WTO (July 6, 1998) (on file with author). For an excellent introduction
to lawyer regulation in cross-border practice, including a concise and comprehensible
overview of the effect of GATS on legal services, see Terry, supra note 10, at 1393-96.
See also Mara M. Burr, Will the General Agreement on Trade in Services Result in
InternationalStandardsfor Lawyers and Access to the World Market? 20 HAMLINE L.
REV. 667 (1997); Orlando Flores, Note, Prospectsfor Liberalizing the Regulation of
Foreign Lawyers Under GATS and NAFTA, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 159 (1996);
Michael J. Chapman & Paul J. Tauber, Note, LiberalizingInternationalTrade in Legal
Services: A Proposalfor an Annex on Legal Services under the GeneralAgreement on
Trade in Services, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 941 (1995).
12.
For a description of the CCBE and its history, see CROSS BORDER PRACTICE
COMPENDIUM, supranote 8, at 3-1 to 3-43. See also Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction
to the EuropeanCommunity's Legal Ethics Code Part . An Analysis of the CCBE Code
of Conduct, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 5-7 (1993) [hereinafter Part1; Laurel S. Terry,
An Introduction to the EuropeanCommunity's Legal Ethics Code Part1: Applying the
CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO. L.J. 345 (1993) [hereinafter Part1]; John Toulmin,
Q.C., A Worldwide Common Code of ProfessionalEthics?, in RIGHTS, LIABILITY, AND
ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE 207-18 (Mary C. Daly & Roger J. Goebel eds.
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the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA) sponsored a Forum
on Transnational Legal Practice in November 1998.13 The sponsors
invited the participation of the organized bars of the OECD member
states, Asia, Africa, and South America. Bar leaders from twentyfive different countries attended the Forum, as did delegates from
three of the major international bar associations. The attendees
represented over sixty percent of the world's lawyers. 14 The two
days of the Forum were almost exclusively devoted to regulatory
issues. The discussions and submissions addressed the right of a
lawyer occasionally to deliver legal services in a country in which the
lawyer is not licensed to practice law, the right of a lawyer to
establish the lawyer's practice in a country in which the lawyer is
not licensed to practice law, and the advisability of countries
5
adopting a foreign legal consultant regime.I
Interesting as these discussions and debates were, what were
even more interesting were the occasions when the Forum's
participants formally and informally turned their attention to lawyer
codes of conduct. It was obvious that U.S. and foreign lawyers
16
perceive their respective lawyer codes of conduct very differently.

1995) [hereinafter RIGHTS, LIABILITY, AND ETHIcS]. See also Council of the Bars and
Law Societies of the European Union (visited Aug. 24, 1999) <http://www.ccbe.org>.
13.
The impetus for the Forum was a 1997 workshop sponsored by the OECD
to assist WPPS. The workshop addressed issues of liberalization of trade in
professional services, including such specific issues as limited liability partnerships
among lawyers and foreign legal consultant regimes. See Donald H. Rivkin,
TransnationalLegal Practice,32 INTt LAw. 423, 425 (1998).
14.
See Joint Closing Communique from the Forum on Transnational Practice
for the Legal Profession, (Nov. 10, 1998) (on file with author). This author was an
observer to the ABA delegation.
15.
See Memorandum from Donald H. Rivkin to the Council concerning the
Forum on Transnational Practice for the Legal Profession (Dec. 10, 1998) (on file with
author); Discussion Papers Presented by the American Bar Association Section of

International Law and Practice, the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the
European Community, and the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, Forum on
Transnational Practice for the Legal Profession (Nov. 9 & 10, 1998) (on file with
author). Professor Terry's articles supply a much needed comprehensive analysis of
the myriad of regulatory issues associated with cross-border practice. See Terry, A
Case Study, supra note 10; Terry, PartI, supra note 12; see also Roger J. Goebel,
Lawyers in the European Community: Progress Toward Community-Wide Rights of
Practice,in RIGHTS, LIABILITY, AND ETHIcS, supranote 12, at 239.
In her article on cross-border legal practice, Professor Terry identifies five
different regulatory models, each of which addresses issues of: (1) scope of practice;
(2) forms of association; and (3) ethics and discipline. See Terry, A Case Study, supra
note 10, at 1428. The discussions at the Paris forum constantly returned to these
three sets of issues.
16.
This was not the first time I had noticed the dissimilarity. I have been
fortunate enough to teach and lecture outside the United States on several occasions
and to have regular contact with foreign lawyers and law students. My observations
at the Forum brought to mind the comments of distinguished comparative law
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To U.S. trained lawyers, the codes of conduct are law or at least lawlike, primarily because of their enforceability. 17 They are the
yardsticks by which grievance committees measure a lawyer's
behavior, judges grant or deny motions, and juries accept or reject
allegations of malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty. 18 To non-U.S.
trained lawyers, the codes of conduct are general norms of
professional behavior. 1 9

The popular understanding is that the
codes of conduct are less legalistic and less formal than their U.S.

counterparts. 20

Professor Hazard has captured the spirit of this

difference: "The English barristers thought it quaint that American

lawyers felt in need of legal rules for their governance, but they
recalled that Americans seemed to need rules for everything. " 2 1 His

comment has even greater force for lawyers trained in the civil law

tradition.
This article will briefly identify some of the reasons for this
difference in perception and speculate about its possible impact on

the regulation of cross-border legal practice. Part II traces the
transformation from standards to rules in the United States. Part III
explores the historical, structural, and economic reasons why a
similar transformation has not occurred in most foreign countries.

scholars that lawyers trained in the civil law tradition "see" the law very differently.
See generally GLENDON ET AL., supranote 7, at 133; Mirjan Damaska, A Continental
Lawyer in an AmericanLaw School: Trials and 7ribulationsof Adjustment, 116 U. PA.
L. REV. 1363 (1968). Professor Vagts, in commenting upon the differences in
litigation styles between U.S. and foreign lawyers, has hinted at this difference:
One could easily imagine the shock to British or Japanese arbitrators and a
British or Japanese court at the approach used by some American litigators.
They might applaud the fact that the rules of the French bar purport to make
"delicatesse," "courtoisies" and "tact" essential principles of the lawyer's
profession.
Detlev F. Vagts, The InternationalLegal Profession:A Need for More Governance:, 90
AM. J. INTL L. 250, 260-61 (1996). For a fascinating study of the international impact
of U.S. style lawyering, see YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER (1996).
17.
See infra notes 108-11, 131-32 and accompanying text.,
18.
The last two descriptions must not be taken too literally. I am well aware
of the line of cases holding (1) that the lawyer codes of ethics are only "guidelines" for
the courts in reviewing a lawyer's behavior; and (2) that breaches of the lawyer codes
of ethics do not constitute a basis for civil liability. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, Scope (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary
Statement (1980); Baxt v. Liloia, 714 A.2d 271 (N.J. 1998).
19.
See infra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
20.
See id.
21.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Ethics, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 30, 1992, at 13. See also H.
Patrick Glenn, ProfessionalStructuresand ProfessionalEthics, 35 McGill L.J. 424, 428
(1990) (noting that British barristers and some European legal professions have little
enthusiasm for written codes of ethics, believing "[r]ules are for others, who may
reasonably be expected to ask precisely what they should do.").
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Finally, Part IV examines how an appreciation for the
standards/rules dichotomy can contribute to a better understanding
of the ethical obligations of lawyers in different legal systems and
ultimately to the adoption of a code of conduct to govern the conduct
of lawyers in cross-border transactions.
Contemporary interest in the rules/standards dichotomy
springs principally from the writings of Duncan Kennedy 2 2 and
other Critical Legal Studies scholars.2 3 "Dichotomy" is really a
misnomer. It is more accurate to speak of a continuum of
discretion. At one end of the continuum are "rules," commands that
constrict a decisionmaker's discretion. 2 4 They reflect a choice
among competing values by a policy-maker who has the authority
to cabin a decisionmaker's choices.2 5 At the other end are
"standards," general principles that allow the decisionmaker greater
discretion in applying the designated values. 2 6 In his seminal law
review article, Kennedy associated rules with Holmes' Bad Man, who
is always looking to the limits of the law to determine precisely how
far he can go in any endeavor without risking civil or criminal
liability. 2 7 The virtues of rules-predictability and stability-are
thus transformed into vices-excessive autonomy and alienated
individualism. 28 Standards are less determinative than rules
because they serve to promote the advancement of abstract ideals
such as goodness and fairness.
From the decisionmaker's
perspective, standards are both a blessing and a burden; a blessing
because they encourage and legitimize nuanced resolutions, a
burden because they demand careful and honest reflection. 2 9 From
the actor's perspective, rules are usually perceived as more conductspecific than standards. In general, they are easier to enforce than

standards, but they are also easier to defend against.30 Building on
Kennedy's work, Professor Rose has argued that the choice between

22.

See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89

HARV. L. REV. 1685 passim (1976).

Of course, the debate existed long before

Professor Kennedy entered into it. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACHS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 138-43

(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds. 1994).
23.
See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987).
24.
See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 58.
25.

See id.

26.
See id.
27.
See Kennedy, supranote 22, at 1744-745.
28.
See Rose, supranote 4, at 592.
29.
Professor Hazard has drawn a similar distinction among "law" (the norms
formally promulgated by a political authority); "morals" (subjective conceptions of
right and wrong); and "ethics" (shared norms based on reciprocal recognition). See
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law, Morals, and Ethics, 10 S. ILL. U. J. 447, 451-453 (1995).
30.
See Grodin, supra note 5, at 570 (discussing a preference for rules by both
the prosecutors and defense counsel in disciplinary proceedings).
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rules and standards is a matter of metaphor or rhetoric, suggesting
the different ways that individuals deal with members of their own
immediate community and with strangers. 3 1
While neither Kennedy's nor Rose's analysis of the
standards/rules dichotomy is entirely satisfactory in explaining the
core differences in perception between U.S. and foreign lawyers with
respect to lawyer codes of conduct, their work identifies a new
vocabulary for discussing those differences and a new paradigm for
their analysis. Understanding the standards/rules dichotomy is an
important first step in the creation of a cross-border code of lawyer
conduct.

II. FROM STANDARDS TO RULES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE LAWYER CODES OF CONDUCT, THE LAWYER DISCIPLINARY
SYSTEM, AND LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES
"Rules" as employed in this essay encompass phenomena as
diverse as the lawyer codes of conduct, the decisions of courts, the
opinions of state bar association ethics committees interpreting the
codes' provisions, the professionalization of the lawyer disciplinary
system, and even legal education.3 2 "Rules" is a shorthand for the
synergistic forces unleashed by the three overseers of the U.S. legal
profession: the organized bar, the courts, and the law schools. The
organized bar drafts lawyer codes of conduct, establishes
committees that interpret them, and sponsors conferences,
programs, and publications that debate, analyze, and apply them.3 3
The courts, as regulators of the legal profession, formally adopt
codes of conduct, require a separate bar examination in legal ethics

for admission to the bar, demand continuing legal education in legal
ethics throughout a lawyer's career, and enforce the codes'
provisions through the disciplinary system.3 4 The courts, as
adjudicators, interpret lawyer codes of conduct in resolving cases
and controversies.3 5 The law schools, to satisfy accrediting

31.
See Rose, supranote 4, at 600-10.
32.
I cannot emphasize too strongly that I am defining the term "rules" quite
broadly and in some respects quite differently than other scholars. See supra notes
1-6 and accompanying text. My use of the term, moreover, is in the context of a
comparativeanalysis. I have no objection to the conclusion that when examined in
isolation, many of the provisions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct are
"standards" as that term is discussed in the traditional literature. Id. For an
insightful analysis on this point, see Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional
Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice,and the Paradigmof ProsecutorialEthics, 69
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 223 (1993).
33.
See infra notes 133-43 and accompanying text.
34.
See infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
35.
See id.
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standards, instruct their students in professional responsibility
through required courses or a pervasive methodology. 36 They also
sponsor conferences, programs, and publications that debate and
analyze lawyer codes of conduct.
A. From Canons to Code to Rules
This article can only sketch the broad outlines of how and why
the format, substance, and spirit of the codes of conduct that govern
the conduct of lawyers changed so radically in this century, a
the metamorphosis of their
transformation poignantly captured by
37
titles-from Canons to Code to Rules.
1. The 1908 Canons of Ethics
The ABA's adoption of the Canons of Professional Ethics in
1908 (1908 Canons) was the result of the natural progression of the
institutionalization of the legal profession in the United States that
began in the 1870s.3 8 The most knowledgeable academics entertain
no doubt as to where to place the Canons on the divide between

standards and rules. Professor Wolfram states that they rest on the
assumption that "all lawyers are sufficiently homogenous to conform
to common standards." 3 9 He has characterized them as "statements
of professional solidarity . . . intended primarily to celebrate the
ancient lineage of the bar's professional stature," and not to serve as
templates for disciplinary actions. 40 The historian James Willard
Hurst has commented upon the Canons' emphasis on "honorable
relationships between individuals." 41 Professor Pearce has

36.
See infra notes. 112-24 and accompanying text.
Professors Luban and Millemann have insightfully pointed out that the
37.
successive titles reflect a deliberate de-moralizing of the profession's ethics codes,
leading to demoralizing legal ethics. See David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good
Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 41-46 (1995).
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 648-52 (2d ed.
38.
1985); KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 214-16 (1989);
JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 285-92, 329-

30 (1950); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.2, at 53-54 (1986). See
also JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN

AMERICA 62-65 (1976); HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 23-25 (1953); Susan D. Carle,
Lawyers' Duty to Do Justice:A New Look at the History of the 1908 Canons, 24 L. &
Soc. Inquiry 1 (1999); Walter B. Jones, Canons of ProfessionalEthics, Their Genesis
and History, 7 NOTRE DAME LAW. 483 (1932).
39.
WOLFRAM, supranote 38, § 2.6.2, at 54.

40.

Id.

41.

HURST, supranote 38, at 329-30.
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42
demonstrated that they are firmly rooted in Republican ideology.
The drafters of the 1908 Canons lauded vagueness and feared
specificity because "[n]o code or set of rules can be framed, which
will particularize all the duties of the lawyer in the varying phases
of litigation or in all the relations of professional life." 4 3
The abstractness and imprecision of the Canons clearly mark
them as standards within Professor Kennedy's framework. Professor
Rose's observations about the different ways that individuals deal with
members of their own immediate community and with strangers point
to the same conclusion. While the process of stratification that would
characterize the legal profession in subsequent years was already
underway in 1908, lawyers still practiced within bounded legal
communities, whether they were a country lawyer with a general
practice, an office lawyer representing powerful industry or
manufacturing clients, or a trial lawyer representing individual clients
in routine civil and criminal matters in an urban metropolis. 44
Lawyers and judges knew one another by name and interacted on a
regular basis. 4 s Within the confines of relatively small geographic
areas, groups of lawyers conducted their clients' legal business,
creating separate professional mini-communities. The composition of
the groups reflected the nature of the representation, such as
litigation, the transfer of real and personal property, the establishment
and liquidation of businesses, and so forth. While lawyers generally
acknowledged their membership in the larger "legal profession," they

primarily perceived themselves as members of smaller professional
communities. Entry into these mini-communities was determined by
class status (e.g., elite, immigrant, etc.), area of practice (e.g.,
corporate, personal injury, etc.), and ethnicity and religion (e.g., WASP,
Irish, Polish, Catholic, Jew).4 6 Each mini-community had its own
shared understandings of the ethical standards governing its
members. Thus, a code of conduct expressed in standards suited the
needs of the 1908 legal profession precisely because, in Rose's words,
they practiced "with members of the same community." 47 Since they
were not strangers, rules were unnecessary.
Intimately related to these shared understandings was the
absence of a meaningful lawyer disciplinary system. The ABA's
adoption of the Canons in 1908 had no direct regulatory
42.
See Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal
Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241 (1992); see also Allison Martson, Guiding
the Profession:The 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State BarAssociation, 49 AiA.
L. REV. 471 (1998) (noting that the changing composition of the legal profession led
to the belief that the unwritten code of professional etiquette would no longer suffice).
43.
CANONS OF ETHics, Preamble (1908).
44.
See generally AUERBACH, supranote 38, at 40-62.

45.

See generally id.

46.
47.

See generally id. at 50, 62, 73.
Rose, supranote 4, at 601-02.
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consequences. State courts took a lackadaisical approach to the
regulation of lawyer conduct; some courts formally adopted the
Canons while others did not. 48 Most courts left lawyer discipline in
the hands of local bar associations. 4 9
Enforcement was
intermittent, haphazard, and often biased against solo and small
firm practitioners who provided legal services to individuals. Too
often the elite lawyers-members of one discrete mini-community
sat in judgment on the conduct of lawyers belonging to a different,
distinct mini-community.5 0
2. The 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility
As the U.S. economy grew increasingly centralized and
urbanized, the Canons became increasingly irrelevant. 5 1 As early
as 1934, Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone lamented "the
petty details of form and manners which have been so largely the
subject of our codes of ethics ....
Our canons of ethics for the
most part are generalizations designed for an earlier era."52 The
organized bar ignored Stone's complaint. But by the late 1960s, the
criticism
had
reached
savage
proportions:
"glittering
53
generalities... [that] lack a body to kick and a soul to condemn;
"vaporous platitudes... which have somewhat less usefulness as
guides to lawyers in the predicaments of the real world than do
valentine cards as guides to heart surgeons in the operating
S4
room."
The practice of law had changed too much for the Canons to
serve as a source of ethical guidance. Broad, sweeping statements
about a lawyer's duty to clients, courts, and the administration of
justice were simply inadequate to guide decisionmaking in areas as
complex as confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and trial publicity.
From the New Deal legislation of the 1930s to the New Society
legislation of the 1960s, the scope and detail of federal government
regulation expanded exponentially. State and local oversight of
commercial activities and civil rights legislation intruded upon the

48.
See WOLFRAM, supra note 38, at 55-56.
49.
See id.
50.
See AUERBACH, supra note 38, at 40-53, 103-29 (studying the response of
elite lawyers to social change in the 20th Century).
51.
See WOLFRAM, supra note 38, § 2.6.2 at 54-55 (discussing the critique of
the Canons in light of an increasingly stratified bar membership).
52.
Harlan F. Stone, The PublicInfluence of the Bar, 48 HARv. L. REV. 1, 10
(1934) (discussing the public influence and the future of the Bar).
53.
WOLFRAM, supra note 38, § 2.6.2 at 55 n. 29 (quoting Starrs, Professional
Responsibility: Three Basic Propositions,5 CRIM. L.Q. 17, 20 (Fall 1966)).
54.
Id. (quoting A. Amsterdam (quoted inTIME Magazine, May 13, 1966, p. 81,
from a letter to the Washington, D.C. grievance committee)).
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legal lives of most citizens in an unprecedented degree. Lawyers
accustomed to advising clients on the meaning and application of
elaborate statutes and convoluted regulations were ill at ease with
Lawyers'
a code of conduct framed in vague generalities.5 5
expectations had changed-they were looking for clearer, more
sharply framed directives.5 6 The Canons seemed incapable of
predictable interpretation. They worked well only when applied to
a set of simple facts. In short, too much imprecision and discretion
produced ethical incoherence, or worse, paralysis. Rules, not
standards, were needed.
Rules were also better suited to the changing institutions of
corporate practice. The corporate law firm was now a well
established figure on the legal landscape.5 7 More lawyers than ever
before were practicing in firms with ten or more lawyers. 5 8 Lawyers
were beginning to join in-house legal departments in significant
numbers.5 9 The Canons, with their heavy emphasis on solo
practitioners, small finns, and litigation practice, seemed
increasingly irrelevant.
That the drafters of the 1969 Model Code 60 experienced the
tension between rules and standards first-hand is perfectly apparent
from the final structure of the text.6 ' The Model Code is divided into
nine parts, each of which is subdivided into three sections: a Canon,
the Ethical Considerations, and the Disciplinary Rules.

As the

Preliminary Statement makes clear, each of these subsections plays

55.
The principal draftsman of the Code described the Canons' "imprecision"
as the primary reason for their downfall. See WOLFRAM, supranote 38, § 2.6.3 at 56
n.40 (citing CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preface (1969)).
56.
See John F. Sutton, Jr., Symposium-The American BarAssociationCode
of ProfessionalResponsibility, 48 TEx. L. REV. 257 (1970).
57.
See Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay. The Transformation of the Big Law
Firm, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROFESSION 37-45 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) (discussing the structural
changes in large law firms in the 1960s); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 64042, 687-95.
58.
See Galanter & Palay, supranote 57, at 31, 37-38.
59.
For a discussion of the growth in the power, prestige, and number of inhouse counsel and how it impacts the delivery of legal services across national
borders, see Mary C. Daly, The Cultural,Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering
for a Global Organization:The Role of the General Counse 46 EMORY L.J. 1057 (1997).
60.
The original document adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in 1969
was titled "Code of Professional Responsibility." As part of the settlement of a federal
antitrust action in 1978, the ABA agreed to add the adjective "Model" to the title.
Since "Model Code" is commonly used in professional responsibility parlance to refer
to the 1969 Code including subsequent amendments, this article will employ that
term. For the history of the adoption of the Model Code, see ANNOTATED CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY at IX-XXI (Am. Bar Found. 1979); WOLFRAM, supra note
38, § 2.6.3 at 56-57.
61.
The drafters deliberately decided not to keep a "legislative history." Thus,
knowledge about the drafting process, policy debates and political compromises is
scanty. See ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supranote 60, at XI.
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a different role. 62 A Canon is a general statement of "axiomatic
norms, expressing in general terms the standards of professional
conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the public,
with the legal system, and with the legal profession."63 In wording
and in spirit, the Model Code Canons are the direct descendants of
the 1908 Canons. The Ethical Considerations, too, are standards;
they are "aspirational in character and represent[ing] the objectives
toward which every member of the profession should strive. They
constitute a body of principlesupon which the lawyer can rely for
64
guidance in many specific situations."
The Canons and the Ethical Considerations both share the
characteristics of standards, not rules. 65 They are vague, imprecise,
and intended to assist a lawyer in exercising the lawyer's discretion.
The Canons and the Ethical Considerations identify the values
about which a lawyer should think in resolving an ethical dilemma,
but they do not command a particular course of action.
The Disciplinary Rules stand in sharp contrast. The drafter's
language excludes discretion or multiple interpretative possibilities.
They are described as "mandatory in character .... stat[ing] the
minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without
being subject to disciplinary action."6 6 In language equally suitable
for a criminal statute, the drafters cautioned:
"Within the
framework of a fair trial, the Disciplinary Rules should be uniformly
applied to all lawyers, regardless of the nature of their professional
activities." 6 7 In sum, as Professor Hazard has so ably captured, the
1908 Canons representing "fraternal norms issuing from an
autonomous professional society have now
been transformed into a
68
body of judicially enforced regulations."

62.
at 2-4.

See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement

63.

Id. at 2-3 (emphasis added).

64.

Id. (footnote omitted & emphasis added). The footnote to this statement

offers even further support for their characterization as standards. Quoting at length
from an ABA study of professional responsibility in 1958, it observes:
The lawyer who seeks a clear understanding of his duties will be led to reflect
on the special services his profession renders to society and the services it
might render if its full capabilities were realized. When the lawyer fully
understands the nature of his office, he will then discern what restraints are
necessary to keep that office wholesome and effective.
Id. (quoting ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J.
1159 (1958)).
65.
See id. at 3.
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Futureof Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239,
1249 (1991).
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3. The 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Over sixty years lapsed between the adoption of the Canons in
1908 and its replacement by the Model Code in 1969. Barely
thirteen years lapsed between the adoption of the Model Code and
its replacement by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules) in 1983.69 Three weaknesses in the Model Code were
especially glaring. First, the Model Code provisions were excessively
concerned with the dilemmas of the courtroom lawyer and paid little
or no attention to those of the business or corporate lawyer. The
lawyer's role as advisor, counselor, and negotiator was generally
ignored as were the lawyer's obligations to third parties. Second,
the Model Code had not envisioned the emergence of the corporate
law firm in which fifty to a hundred lawyers would practice together,
offering a wide rage of legal services to multistate and multinational
business clients. Consequently, it failed to address ethical issues
unique to this practice setting in any significant way. Third, the
Model Code contained no provision to guide ethical decisionmaking
in matters involving subsequent representation adverse to the
interests of a former client.7 0
It was not just these flaws in the Model Code that led to its
rejection. The demographic profile of the legal profession was
changing dramatically between 1969 and 1983. 7 1 Each year, U.S.
law schools were graduating an ever-increasing number of students.
In 1970, 15,000 applicants applied for admission to the bar. 72 By
1980, the number rose to 30,000. 73 In 1971, the U.S. lawyer
population was one-third of a million. 7 4 In 1980, it was close to half
a million. 75 In gender, race, and socio-economic background, these

new entrants differed from previous cohorts. More women, minority

group members, and individuals from the blue-collar strata of the
middle class were joining the profession. 76 In sum, heterogeneity

69.

See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 18.

70.

See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 13-

15 (2d ed. 1994); WOLFRAM, supra note 38, at 56-59, 60-63.
71.
See BARBARA A. CURRAN & CLARA N. NELSON, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LAWYER
STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 1988 1-14 (1992).

72.
See id. at 1.
73.
See id.
74.
See id.
75.
See id.
76.
See id. See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 87-111 (1989);
Robert L. Nelson, The _mtures of American Lawyers: A DenographicProfile of a
ChangingProfession in a ChangingSociety, in LAWYERS: A CRITICAL READER 20, 20-26
(Richard L. Abel ed. 1997) (examining demographic shift in the U.S. legal profession
in the 20th century). While more minorities were entering the profession, their
progress was limited. See also DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 89-97

(2d ed. 1995); American Bar Association Task Force on Minorities in the Legal
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was changing the profession's demographic profile, as previously
77
excluded "strangers" entered the legal community.
The transition from standards to rules was also a response to

the increasing presence of out-of-state lawyers and law firms in
markets previously reserved to local lawyer mini-communities.
Advances in telecommunications and transportation enabled
lawyers to comur
lunicate with clients and other lawyers across the
country and to travel with relative ease from one part of the United
States to another.
The introduction of the multistate bar
examination encouraged recent graduates and even experienced
lawyers to obtain a license to practice law in more than one
jurisdiction. Thus, new "strangers" in the form of out-of-state
lawyers and law finns disrupted long standing, fraternal minicommunities across the United States in the late 1960s, 1970s, and
78
early 1980s.
Law firms, especially the larger ones, were also undergoing
changes in structure, culture, and identity during this period. 7 9 To
fuel their expansion, large law firms for the first time began to hire
from second-tier law schools and to recruit lateral hires in large
numbers.8 0 The presence of these "strangers" became a routine
occurrence at the firms' meetings. At a meta level, rules hold out
the promise of stability and familiarity for law firms in flux: stability
because all the firm's lawyers are subject to the same ethical

Profession, Report with Recommendations (1986); American Bar Association Task
Force on Minorities and Achieving Justice in a Diverse America at 20-28 (1992).
77.
In commenting upon the growth of the legal profession, Professor Wilkins
has protested "the idea that all 800,000 American lawyers share a common

professional culture capable of producing uniform answers to ethical problems
strains credibility." David B. Wilkins, Legal Realismfor Launers, 104 HARV. L. REV.
468, 488 (1990). His solution is to propose a new model for lawyer regulation,
suggesting the move "[flrom partisanship to purposivism" in which "[c]ontext must
replace universality as the touchstone of system design." Id. at 505, 515. He
advocates for a set of mid-level principles (ie., between standards and rules) that
would be context specific. See id. at 505-15.
78.
Making a similar observation and discussing similar forces, Professor
Hazard described the bar as becoming a "community of strangers." See Hazard, The
Futureof Legal Ethics, supranote 68, at 1259-60.
79.
While the precise cause and effect relationship is uncertain, the movement
from standards to rules was undoubtedly also influenced by the shift in the balance
of power between corporate counsel and outside law finms. See Daly, supranote 59,
at 1059-67. Rules make it easier for clients, especially sophisticated ones, to have
settled expectations and to monitor and evaluate the conduct of their lawyers. By
lessening the discretion available to lawyers, rules provide clients with a clearer set
of benchmarks. In terms of the relative ease of enforceability, rules favor clients
more than standards do. As more foreign clients gain exposure to a U.S. style of
lawyering and the rules-orientation of the lawyer codes of conduct, they may
affi-matively encourage a shift from standards to rules in their own countries.
80.
See Galanter & Palay, supranote 57, at 50-54.
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obligations; familiarity because all the lawyers have a similar
understanding of those obligations. The legal profession's embrace

of rules and jettison of standards was partly a response to the need
of large law firms for a clearer, more direct set of professional norms
that reduced the permissible range of a lawyer's ethical discretion.
The drafting and adoption of the Model Rules was a tortured
process. 8 ' Its final conformation bore almost no resemblance to that
of either the 1908 Canons or the Model Code. The drafters
completely abandoned the Model Code's tripartite structure-i.e.,
Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules-in favor of
a binary structure modeled on the Restatements of Laws' black
letter rule and commentary.8 2 The selection of the Restatement
format is a telling detail of the transition from standards to rules.
The Restatements, of course, are carefully drafted digests of law,
8 3
not standards.
It would be a serious mistake in judgment to assume that each
Model Rule is a "rule" in the sense of the standards/rule dichotomy.
The Scope section identifies three different types of rules: "Some...
are imperatives, cast in the terms 'shall' or 'shall not.'... Others,
generally cast in the term 'may,' are permissive and define areas
under the Rules in which the lawyer has professional discretion....
Other Rules define the nature of relationships between the lawyer
84
and others."
As this language evidences, the drafters did not entirely banish
standards from the Model Rules. The overwhelming majority of the
Model Rules, however, are cast in the imperative. Moreover, even
those that employ permissive language are more detailed and
precise than provisions in the 1908 Canons and Model Code. Most
of the standards-like language can be found in the Comments to the
rules whose function is to "provide guidance for practicing in
compliance with the Rules,"8 5 not to add obligations. While certain
Rules acknowledge the lawyer's professional discretion, they bind

81.
See Ted Schneyer, Professionalismas Bar Politics:The Making of the Model
Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 1989 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 677, 678. See generally ABA
CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1987).

82.
See Murray L. Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM.
B., FOUND. RES. J. 953, 953 ("[Tjhe model rules deliberately eschew references to
ethics; they are at least in form more a set of detailed requirements for a regulated
industry than a set of ethical principles.").
83.
See infra notes 138-43 and accompanying text. See also Lawrence J.
Latto, The Restatement of the Law GoverningLawyers: A View from the Trenches, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 697, 712 (1998) (discussing the evolution of the Restatement).
84.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supranote 18, Scope.

See also

WOLFRAM, supranote 38, § 2.6.4 at 63. Professor Zacharias has suggested that the
relationship among the three different types of rules can be measured by the
benchmark of a "specificity continuum." Zacharias, supra note 32, at 244.
85.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supranote 18, Scope at 11.
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that discretion more tightly. 86 The purpose of the Model Rules was
to command the conduct of lawyers, not to recommend the
consideration of vague and imprecise values in ethical
decisionmaking. In short, despite the lingering presence of some

sentiments associated with standards in the Model Rules, their
adoption was a watershed in the transition from standards to rules
that took place over the course of almost one hundred years.

With the widespread adoption of the Model Rules, 87 the battle

88
between standards and rules is largely over in the United States.

86.
See id.
87.
Approximately forty-one states have adopted the Model Rules. See LAWS.
MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 01:3 to 01:4 (1999). A number of states,
however, have modified the provisions relating to confidentiality, conflicts of interest,
advertising, and solicitation.
88.
The academic support for this proposition is very strong. See, e.g.,
Hazard, The Futureof Legal Ethics, supranote 68, at 1241 ("[O]ver the last twenty-five
years or so the traditional norms have undergone important changes. One important
development is that those norms have become 'legalized.' The rules of ethics have
ceased to be internal to the profession; they have instead become a code of public law
enforced by formal adjudicative disciplinary process."); Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K.
Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors:The Controversies Over the Anticontact and SubpoenaRules, 53 U. PITT L. REV. 291, 300 (1992) ("Since about 1930,
with accelerating speed since 1970, ethical codes have developed into law.") (citing
id.; Murray L. Schwartz, The Death and Regenerationof Ethics, 1980 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 953.); Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tighter Rules of ProfessionalConduct: Saltwater
or Thirst?, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 311, 322 (1987) (commenting on "[tihe trend
toward more comprehensive and mandatory codification."); Zacharias, supranote 32,
at 223 ("Over time, the professional codes governing lawyer behavior have become
statutory in form."); inf-a notes 138-43 and accompanying text (discussing the rulelike approach of the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS).
If there is any lingering doubt about the validity of this proposition, the
amendments to the Model Rules being proposed by the Ethics 2000 Commission and
the Reporter's Explanation of Changes might dispel that doubt.
See
<http://wvvw.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html> (visited Aug. 2, 1999). The use of
standards in connection with lawyer regulation has not entirely disappeared,
however. In response to a long litany of complaints about lawyer civility and
professionalism, the ABA, state bar associations, and the federal and state courts
have adopted a variety of lawyer civility codes. These codes neither replace nor
supplement existing codes of lawyer conduct. Most of them explicitly state that a
violation of a provision may not be a basis for discipline. Their purpose is entirely
aspirational. Their tone and format are clearly those of standards, not rules. See
PROFESSIONALISM COMM., AMERICAN BAR ASsN SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS
TO THE BAR, TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM (1996); ILLINOIS STATE BAR Assoc.
SPECIAL COMM. ON PROFESSIONALISM, THE BAR, THE BENCH AND PROFESSIONALISM IN
ILLINOIS:
PROUD TRADITIONS, TOUGH NEW PROBLEMS, CURRENT CHOICES (1987);
Symposium, Legal Professionalism, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 613 (1997); Mark A.
Aaronson, Be Just to One Another: PreliminaryThoughts on Civility, Moral Character,
and .Professionalism,8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 113, 115 (1995); Warren E. Burger, The
Decline of Professionalism, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 949, 956 (1995). See also Austin
Sarat, Enactments of Professionalism: A Study of Judges' and LauJers'Accounts of
Ethics and Civility in Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 809 (1998).

1134

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32:1117

Rules are the new tools of measurement for lawyer conduct. In
many respects, the courts and disciplinary authorities apply them
just as they would other codes of law.8 9
B. How Changes in the Lawyer Disciplinary System
Contributed to the Transitionfrom Standardsto Rules
Lawyer discipline in the United States has always been an
embarrassment. Prior to the 1870s and the institutionalization of the
legal profession, no formal mechanisms for discipline appear to have
existed. 90 To the extent discipline was imposed at all, it took place
locally and informally. Presumably, a lawyer who violated the norms
of the community within which she practiced suffered informal
exclusion by its members. 9 1 On occasion, she may have been
formally exiled from the community by disbarment or censure. In
general, however, there were no formal mechanisms for lawyer
discipline just as there were no formal mechanisms for the admission
92
of lawyers, such as state-wide judicially administered procedures.

89.

Many courts, especially in the context of disqualification motions, have

pointedly stated that lawyer codes of conduct are "guidelines" to inform their
decisionmaking, freeing the courts from the interpretative restraints associated with
statutes. See, e.g., Niesig v. Team 1, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1032 (N.Y. 1990). While such
statements are correct, they do not diminish the observation that the courts generally
treat lawyer codes as "rules," routinely employing the interpretive techniques
associated with statutory construction such as incorporating caselaw, disciplinary
opinions, legislative history, academic literature, and public policy into the process
of decisionmaking. See, e.g., United States v. Hammad, 846 F.2d 854, 859 (2d Cir.
1988), rev'd, 858 F.2d 834, 837 (2d Cir. 1988). For an illuminating discussion of the
problems associated with interpreting lawyer codes of conduct, see Bruce A. Green,
Doe v. Grievance Committee: On the Interpretationof EthicalRules, 55 BROOK. L. REV.
485 (1989), and Bruce A. Green, A Prosecutor'sCommunications with Defendants:
What Are the Limits?, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 283, 313-17 (1988). See also Robert P. Lawry,
Lying, Confidentiality,and the Adversary System of Justice, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 653,
688 (arguing that the Disciplinary Rules should be "interpreted as a statute").
90.
See Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer DisciplinaryProcedures
in the United States, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911 (1994). Before the 1870s,
[l]awyers [were] subject to the summary power of the judges in whose courts
they practiced but the proceedings were ad hoc, i.e., dependent upon those

judges to initiate them. Thus, it is not surprising that, '[d]iscipline by the
courts was invoked only in rare and extreme cases.'
Id. at 917 (quoting ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 185
(1953)). See generally THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA
(W. Gawalt. ed. 1984); Maxwell Bloomfield, Lawyers and Public Criticism: Challenge
and Response in Nineteenth-CenturyAmerica, 15 J. AM. LEGAL HIST. 269 (1971).
91.
See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 76, at 847 (noting "[c]ommunity
disapproval was the primary sanction for professional misconduct.... ."). In smaller
communities, this is still true, at least for professionalism-type violations such as
incivility.

See DONALD D. LANDON, COUNTRY LAWYERS: THE IMPACT OF CONTEXT ON

PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 9-11, 16-17, 142-45 (1990).
92.
See generally Devlin, supranote 90.
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Lawyer disciplinary systems became somewhat more formalized

in the early twentieth century, especially in those jurisdictions that
had unified bars. 93 In almost all states, however, bar association
grievance committees were the engines of the disciplinary system.
Committee members conducted investigations, heard the testimony
of witnesses, and rendered judgments. 9 4 Depending on the severity
of the sanction imposed, a formal court approval might be necessary
for the sanction to become effective. 9s
On occasion, these
committees abused their authority 6by disciplining lawyers for their
9
political beliefs or social activism.
The sorry state of discipline became a matter of public scandal
in the early 1970s, when the ABA released a nation-wide study
prepared by a blue-ribbon commission chaired by former Supreme
Court Justice Tom Clark. The Clark Commission did not mince
words, describing the state of lawyer discipline as a "scandalous
situation."9 7 Discipline in most states was erratic. Investigations
took too long. Relying on volunteers produced flawed outcomes.
Local grievance committees too often indulged their members'
biases, engaged in rampant favoritism, and meted out widely
different sanctions in the same jurisdiction for comparable offenses.
Sanctions for similar conduct also differed greatly from state to
state. Regardless of whether a lawyer's conduct was measured by
98
standards or rules, the disciplinary system was in shambles.
The impetus for overhaul increased as a result of several
Supreme Court decisions in which the Court held that the Sherman

93.
See id. at 920; RHODE & LUBAN, supranote 76, at 847-48.
94.
See Devlin, supranote 90, at 919; see also ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVAL.
OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5-6 (1970)
[hereinafter COMM. ON EVAL. OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT].
95.
See Devlin, supranote 90, at 919.
96.
In describing the disciplinary system in the 1960s, Auerbach observed:
Discipline still reflected the ethnic and economic divisions within the bar:
those who administered discipline remained a class apart from those who
received it. Professional associations still represented a 'white, wealthy, and
politically conservative' constituency that was determined to resist the
political activism of those who were often not white, usually not wealthy, and
invariable not politically conservative.
AUERBACH, supra note 38, at 292 (citing Christopher S. Lyman, State BarDiscipline
and the Activist Lawyer, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV., 384-85, 392 (1973)); David N.
Rockwell, Comment, Controlling Lawyers by BarAssociations and Courts, 5 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 301-03, 309, 312-14 (1970).
97.
See COMM. ON EVAL. OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supranote 94, at 1. See
generallyWOLFRAM, supranote 38, § 3.1 at 80.
98.
See COMM. ON EVAL. OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 94, at 2527, 30-33, 48-54.
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Antitrust Act applied to professions.9 9 The Court's decision in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar'0 0 particularly alarmed bar association

grievance committees.

In that case, the Court held that a bar

association's maintenance of a suggested fee schedule for routine

legal services, such as residential house closings, violated the
Sherman Act.' 0 ' It seemed only a matter of time until a similar
claim was successfully raised about other bar association activities
including disciplinary enforcement.' l 2 In many states, it was
questionable whether the members of bar association grievance
committees qualified as state actors entitled to immunity from the
antitrust laws.10 3
Adding to the bar associations' concern about potential liability
and treble damages awards in private antitrust actions was the
clearly expressed interest of the Federal Trade Commission and the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice in bar association
activities. Both government agencies took a dim view of activities
having an anti-competitive impact, including the adoption 0and
4
enforcement of specific provisions in lawyer codes of conduct.'
The stinging criticisms of the Clark report, the failure of the bar
associations' informal systems of lawyer discipline, and the
associations' fear of possible antitrust liability eventually led to the
establishment of formal regulatory systems for lawyer discipline. In
most states, the courts assumed the responsibility for administering
the new systems. The process of discipline became regularized, and
due process values were incorporated in the system's procedures.' 0 s
Most importantly, the disciplinary agencies hired a full-time staff of
lawyers to investigate and prosecute cases. The professional
standing of these lawyers within the legal community legitimized the
disciplinary process in a way that the informal system had not.10 6 .
The creation of this cadre ultimately lead to the establishment of two

See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982);
99.
National Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982);
National Socy of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
100. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Paul H. Francis & Jennifer J. Johnson, The Emperor's Old
Clothes: Piercing the Bar's Ethical Veil, 13 WILLAMETTE L.J. 221 (1977); Douglas V.
Rigler, ProfessionalCodes of Conduct after Goldfarb: A Proposed Method of Antitrust
Analysis, 29 ARK. L. REv. 185 (1975).
103. See, e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984); Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). See also WOLFRAM, supranote 38, § 2.4.2 at 42-43.
104. For a detailed chronology of their actions, see Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise
Men Wisely: The Risks andRewards of PurchasingLegal Services from Lawyers in a
MultidisciplinaryPartnership,- GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS __ n. 139 (forthcoming, 2000).
See also WOLFRAM, supranote 38, § 2.4.1 at 38-41, nn. 40-41.
105. See Devlin, supra note 90, at 928-29.
106. See id. at 926.
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separate professional associations of bar counsel and of lawyers who
10 7
regularly defend attorneys in disciplinary proceedings.
The regularization and professionalization of the disciplinary
system contributed significantly to the move from standards to

rules.10 8 Prosecuting lawyers for violating rules is more just than

prosecuting them for violating standards for three reasons. First, it
gives the bar counsel objective measures by which to judge the

conduct of the lawyer during the investigative phase of the
disciplinary process. Rules cabin the bar counsel's discretion far
better than standards. Second, the rules' specificity and detail
facilitate a vigorous defense by providing non-ambiguous
measurements by which to test the bar counsel's allegations. 10 9
Third, prosecuting lawyers for violating rules circumscribes the
scope of deliberation by the trier of fact.
Determining guilt by measuring the lawyer's conduct against a
set of rules promotes objectivity in an environment where objectivity
is often difficult to maintain." 0
In a multitude of ways, a

107.
They are, respectively, the National Organization of Bar Counsel, see
COMM. ON EVAL. OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 94, at 98, and the
Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers (APRL), see Seth Rosner, APRL in
Paris, 7 PROF. LAW., Aug. 1996, at 15; Seth Rosner, A Decade of Professionalism, 6
PROF. LAw., Aug. 1995, at 2.
108.
Precisely how successful they have been in improving the efficiency of the
disciplinary system is not all together clear. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N COMMN ON
EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES x-xii,
36, 40-41 (1991); AMERICAN BAR ASSN COMM'N ON PROFESSIONS IN THE PUB. SERVICE:
A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 10-19 (1986); Timothy
K. McPike & Mark I. Harrison, Lauyer Discipline Since 1970, in ALI-ABA COMM. ON
CONTINUING PROF. EDUC., LAW PRACTICE QUALITY EVALUATION: AN APPRAISAL OF PEER
REVIEW AND OTHER MEASURES TO ENHANCE PROFESSIONAL PERFORMANCE 197-98 (1987).
109.
Professor Zacharias has made a similar point in discussing disciplinary
proceedings:
The ability to establish code violations and uphold convictions depends on the
presence of a rule with sufficient scope to cover the offending conduct, but
,which defines the elements of the offense in a way susceptible of proof. The
more objective the elements and the easier it is for enforcers to find evidence
...
the more likely it is that enforcers will seek and be able to maintain a
conviction. The enforceability of professional regulations, therefore, should

vary directly-though perhaps not proportionally"-with the specificity of the
regulations.
Zacharias, supra note 32, at 252-53.
110. As Professor Wolfram has observed:
Unnecessary breadth is to be regretted in professional rules that can be used
to deprive a person of his or her means of livelihood through sanctions that
are universally regarded as stigmatizing. Vague mandatory rules for lawyers
create several difficulties. Plainly, they can be applied corruptly or for
reasons of impermissible bias. For example, vague rules have fed charges,
whether true or not, that the lawyer codes are used selectively against
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disciplinary proceeding is a trial by one's peers. Other lawyers are
the trier of fact and law as well as the sanctioning body. The
decisionmaker and the lawyer-respondent are linked by common
professional training, namely, law school. Depending upon the
circumstances of the charges, they may share practice experiences
(e.g., trial work, transactional representation, etc.) practice settings
(e.g., solo, small firm, large firm, etc.) and areas of concentration
(e.g., criminal, family, real estate law, etc.). They frequently practice
in the same geographic area (e.g., county, town, city). In many
instances, the trier approaches the task of fact finding and

sanctioning with a sentiment best expressed as "there but for the

grace of God, go I. " "'
Using rules rather than standards to
measure the lawyer's conduct encourages the trier of fact to
disregard these common ties. It facilitates a more objective
evaluation.
In short, the transition from standards to rules was a
synergistic process in which the changes in the lawyer disciplinary
system played an important role. Transferring responsibility for
administering the system from bar association committees to the
courts ultimately resulted in significant changes in the procedures
used to discipline lawyers and in the substance of the charges
brought against them. It diminished the possibility of impermissible
bias in the commencement of the proceedings and in the
investigative, fact-finding, and sanctioning stages. Formal judicial
oversight of the disciplinary system led to the creation of a cadre of
professional bar counsel.
C. How Legal Education Contributedto the Transition
from Standardsto Rules

For most of the twentieth century, legal educators did not
regard professional responsibility as a subject meriting serious
study. 1 12 An occasional law school offered a course in legal ethics,

lawyers who defend unpopular causes or clients. Vague phrases are also

objectionable because they substantially dilute the procedural protections

that otherwise narrow the area within which agencies could act arbitrarily or
mistakenly.

supranote 38, § 3.3.1 at 87 (footnotes omitted).
I can personally attest to the pervasiveness of the sentiment, having
served for six years as a member of a disciplinary committee in New York. In all
WOLFRAM,

111.

candor, I must also acknowledge whole-heartedly sharing in the sentiment during a
number of proceedings.
112. See Russel G. Pearce, TeachingEthics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most
ImportantSubject in Law School, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 719, 722 (1998) (explaining that

limited attention has been given to the instruction of legal ethics in the twentieth
century).
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but it was not mandatory.1 1 3 At its best, the course consisted of a
rote introduction to a code of lawyer conduct and, at its worst, of the
tired war stories of a distinguished local lawyer, judge, or alumnus.
The course lacked any semblance of serious intellectual content.
Moreover, scholarly interest in the area was virtually nil." 4 In sum,
neither the full-time faculty nor the student body took professional
responsibility seriously.
The notorious involvement of lawyers in the Watergate scandal
prompted the ABA to amend its accrediting standards in 1974 to
"require for all student candidates for a professional degree
instruction in the duties and responsibilities of the legal
profession."" 5 Initially, legal educators were generally hostile to the
amendment, viewing it as an intrusion into their jealously guarded
prerogative of academic freedom." 6 In a response that Freudian
analysts would undoubtedly characterize as passive aggressive
behavior, law school deans and faculties signaled their displeasure
by offering professional responsibility as a one-credit course.
Frequently, it was taught by local lawyers or judges as adjunct
faculty members or by full-time junior faculty members as a rite-ofpassage. Not surprisingly, surveys showed that the students viewed
legal ethics courses as "requiring less time, as substantially easier,
as a less valuable use of class time" than
as less well taught, 1and
17
their other courses.
The hostility of the deans, faculty members, and students
ultimately diminished. Today, professional responsibility is a
flourishing academic enterprise. The Section on Professional
Responsibility is one of the largest sections of the American
Association of Law Schools (AALS). The AALS and law schools
regularly sponsor conferences devoted to legal ethics issues. Law

113.

See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword:The Legal Profession:u The Impact of

Law and Legal Theory, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 239, 240 (1998) (citing Deborah L.
Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 31 (1992); Pearce,
supra note 112, at 722-25 (discussing the role of legal ethics in legal education in the
twentieth century). See generally ROBERT BOCKING STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s (1983).
114.
For an insightful history of the teaching of professional responsibility in
U.S. law schools, see James E. Molitemo, An Analysis of Ethics Teaching in Law

Schools: Replacing Lost Benefits of the Apprentice System in the Academic Atmosphere,
60 U. CIN. L. REv. 83 (1991) and Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method,
42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31 (1992).
115.
STANDARDS FOR THE APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, Standard 302(a)(iii) (A.B.A.
1974).
116.
The accrediting standards make no mention of any other required subject

matter. See K.C. Cole Jansenn, "We'll Murder Them in August": Who Decides How
Ethics Should be Taught?, 4 JURIS DR. 19, 20 (Jul.-Aug. 1974).

117.

See Ronald M. Pipldn, Law School Instructionin ProfessionalResponsibility:

A CurricularParadox,1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 247,.258.
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reviews include single articles devoted to the subject as part of their
regular issues 18 and publish entire volumes devoted to it.1 1 9 Five
20
law journals publish only articles on professional responsibility.'
12
2
12 1
and casebooks abound.
The
Academics write treatises on it
ultimate proof of its academic respectability may be the recent
acknowledgment of professional responsibility as a subject worthy
of game theory 2 3 and law and economic 12 4 analysis.
All of this activity has contributed enormously to the transition
from standards to rules. The more seriously the academic

118. See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, Paying the Pricefor HeightenedEthics Scrutiny:
Legal Defense Funds and Other Ways That Government Officials Pay TheirLawyers,
50 STAN. L. REv. 65 (1997); Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct
Should Govern Lawyers in FederalCourt and How Should the Rules Be Createdp,64
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 460 (1996); Ted Schneyer, ProfessionalDisciplineforLaw FirmsP,
77 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1991).

119. See, e.g., Symposium, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work. An
Interfaith Conference, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998); Special Issue, Institutional
Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (1996); Symposium,
W.M. Keck FoundationForum on the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1 (1996); Symposium, Teaching Legal Ethics, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. SummerAutumn 1995, 1; Symposium, Ethics and the MultiurisdictionalPracticeof Law, 36 S.
TEX. L. REv. 657 (1995); Symposium, The Future of the Legal Profession,44 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 333 (1994).

120. They are The GeorgetownJournalof Legal Ethics, The Journalof the Legal
Profession, The Journalof the Institutefor the Study of Legal Ethics, The Notre Dame
Journalof Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, and The ProfessionalLawyer.
121.
See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING (2d ed. 1990 & 1998 Supp.); WOLFRAM, supranote 38.
122.
See, e.g., NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF
PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION (1996); STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS (5th ed. 1998); HAZARD FT AL., supra, note 70; THOMAS
D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (6th ed. 1995); JOHN THOMAS NOONAN & RICHARD W. PAINTER,
PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER (1997); RHODE & LUBAN,
supranote 76.

123. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Response to Painter,65 FORDHAM L. REV. 201 (1996);
Richard W. Painter, Game Theoretic and ContractarianParadigms in the Uneasy
RelationshipBetween Regulators and Regulatory Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 149
(1996).
124. See, e.g., George M. Cohen, When Law and Economics Met Professional

Responsibility, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 273 (1998); Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of
the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective,49 MD. L. REV. 869 (1990); Ronald
J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword:Business Lawyers and Value Creationfor
Clients, 74 OR. L. REv. 1 (1995); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of
a Third-PartyEnforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986); Steven Shaven,
Legal Advice About Contemplated Acts: The Decision to Obtain Advice, Its Social
Desirability,and Protectionof Confidentiality, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 123 (1988). Law and
economics scholars are also beginning to study the regulation of the legal profession
in Europe. See REGULATION OF THE PROFESSIONS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH TO
THE REGULATION OF ATTORNEYS AND PHYSICIANS IN THE U.S., BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS,
GERMANY, AND THE U.K. (Michael Faure et al. eds. 1993).
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community treats legal ethics, the more it is perceived as law, as
rules.
D. How the Courts Contributedto the
l2 5
Transitionfrom Standards to Rules
The courts perform two distinct functions with respect to lawyer
codes of conduct and the regulation of the legal profession. First, as
noted above, they bear the principal responsibility for the codes'
adoption and enforcement. 126 In short, they command and control.
Their contribution to the transition from standards to rules,
however, extends beyond those responsibilities. Forty-seven states
require that applicants for admission to the bar pass the MultiState
Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE). 12 7 Until March
1999, the MPRE tested a candidate's knowledge only of the Model
Code, Model Rules, and the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.' 28
Thus, the courts seized upon demonstrated knowledge of the lawyer
codes as being a unique marker of fitness to practice law. A review
of the test-preparation literature published by the National
Conference of Bar Examiners and the study aids produced by the
commercial bar study companies show that they approach the
MPRE as a rules-based test. The courts' regulatory insistence on
the importance of familiarity with the lawyer codes does not end
with the admission process. Approximately thirty-seven states now
require that lawyers participate in Continuing Legal Education (CLE)
programs as a condition of licensure. 12 9 A state-by-state survey
indicates that instruction in legal ethics is a mandatory requirement
0
in each jurisdiction. 13
Second, the courts interpret the codes in the course of ancillary
proceedings related to the adjudication of disputes between parties

125.
Unless otherwise indicated references to "courts" will be to the state
courts. From a historical perspective, the federal courts have played a diminished
role in the adoption and the enforcement of lawyer codes of conduct. See generally
Green, supranote 118.
126.
See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
127.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, MULTITSATE PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EXAMINATION: 1999 INFORMATION BULLETIN 1 (1998).
128.
In response to the repeated criticism that the MPRE's coverage was too

limited, the National Conference of Bar Examiners agreed to modify the examination
by including new subject matter areas. See id. at 29-31; Memorandum from Erica
Moeser to Law School Deans (Aug. 21, 1997) (on file with author). The first
examination to test on the new areas was administered in March, 1999. See Moeser,
Memorandum, supra. For a thoughtful criticism of the MPRE, see Leslie C. Levin,
The MPRE Reconsidered, 86 KY. L.J. 395, 397 (1998).
129.
See ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT 21:3001-13 (1999).
130.
See Interview with Arthur Garwin, Professionalism Counsel, ABA Center
on Professional Responsibility, February 12, 1999.
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in a litigation (e.g., motions to disqualify, impose sanctions, or
approve fees, etc.) or in the course of primary proceedings related to
the adjudication of disputes between lawyers and their clients (e.g.,
an action to recover fees or an action for malpractice or breach of a
fiduciary duty, etc.) 13 1 Code provisions thus directly enter the
judicial arena where litigants can debate their application and
meaning; trial courts can interpret them; appellate courts can review
that interpretation; and scholarly authors can comment upon the
courts' interpretation and review. 13 2 The extensive judicialization"

of professional responsibility is a distinctive feature of the U.S. legal
system and has influenced the transition from standards to rules.
E. How OtherActivities of the Organized Bar Contributed
to the Transitionfrom Standardsto Rules
The ABA, state and local bar associations, and the American
Law Institute (ALI) have contributed to the transition from standards
to rules in a variety of ways. The ABA's establishment and support
of the Center on Professional Responsibility (Center) has played a
critical role. The ABA generally addresses substantive issues within
different practice areas through the activities of its thirty-four
sections, standing committees, and special committees and
commissions. Their subject matters run the gamut from Air Force
law to zoning.13 3 From time to time, the ABA appoints commissions
to study matters of urgency cutting across the interests of several
l3 4
sections or of particular importance to the legal profession.

131.
Cf. WOLFRAM, supra note 38, § 2.6.1 at 48-53 (describing the most
common nondisciplinary uses of lawyer codes of conduct).
132.
See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial
Role, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71 (1996); Susan R. Martyn, Developing the Judicial Role
in ControllingLitigation Conflicts:Response to Green, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 131 (1996);
Kenneth L. Penegar, The Loss of Innocence: A BriefHistory of Law Finn Disqualification
in the Courts, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 831 (1995).
133.
See 1997-1998 ABA DIREcroRYviii-ib (1997).
134,
For example, in August 1998, the President of the ABA appointed a
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice to study, inter alia, whether and to what
extent the Model Rules should be amended to permit lawyers to enter into
partnerships with non-lawyers for the delivery of legal services and to share legal fees

with nonlawyers. See ABA COMM. ON MULTIDISCIPINARY PRACTICE, BACKGROUND PAPER
ON MULTIDSICIPLINARY PRACTICE: ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS (visited July 26, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/multicomreportO199.html>. For a complete description
of the issues involved in multidiscplinary practice, the Commission's proceedings,
and its Report with Recommendation, see Daly, supra note 104.
In large measure, the establishment of the Commission was prompted by the
activities of the Big 5 accounting firms outside the United States. In many other parts
of the world, lawyers and nonlawyers may enter into business, financial, and
employment relationships related to the delivery of legal services that U.S. codes of
conduct prohibit. See id. See also Richard L. Abel, TransnationalLaw Practice,44
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 737, 747-48 (1994); John Gibeaut, Squeeze Play:As Accountants
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Only professional responsibility, however, is sufficiently
important to be separately housed in its own center within the ABA.
The Center sponsors conferences, publishes books, and supports
numerous ABA initiatives related to legal ethics. It maintains an
ethics hotline that lawyers may call for assistance in resolving
ethical dilemmas. Moreover, the Center's leadership role extends to
the entire U.S. professional responsibility community since it works
closely with state bar associations and state courts in a wide variety
of ethics-related activities.1 3 5 The Center has played an important
role in persuading the states to adopt the Model Rules and regularly
publishes high quality materials relating to their application and
interpretation.' 3 6
In addition, the ABA sponsors standing
committees on professional discipline.
Many state and local bar associations support at least one
committee whose function is to respond to inquiries from lawyers
about current ethical dilemmas.' 3 7 Most committees issue both
informal and formal opinions; some also sponsor an ethics hotline
to answer telephone inquiries. In addition, larger bar associations
may also appoint separate committees on lawyer discipline and
professional responsibility. Bar association journals publish articles
or regular columns on ethics, professionalism, and malpractice.
These topics are often the single subject of bar association
programs. Programs devoted to other subjects often include

Edge into the Legal Market, Lawyers May Find Themselves Not Only Blindsided by the
Assault but Also Limited by ProfessionalRules, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1998, at 24; David M.
Trubek, et al., Global Restructuringand the Law: Studies of the Internationalizationof
Legal Fieldsand the Creationof TransnationalArenas, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407,
434-35 (1994); Gianluca Morello, Note, Big Six Accounting Finns Shop World Widefor
Law Finns: Why Multi-DisciplinePracticesShould Be Permittedin the United States, 21
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 190 (1997). For an overview of recent developments concerning
lawyer-accountant multidisciplinary practices, see Laurel S. Terry, What If ... P The
Consequences of Court Invalidationof Launjer-AccountantMultidisciplinaryPartnership
Bans, at nn. 13-28 in PRIVATE INVESTMENTS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1998 (1998).
135.
For a more complete description of the Center's activities, see
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/cpr.html> (visited Aug. 4, 1999).
136.
E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra, note 18; ABA/BNA
LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1999).
137.
One telling indicia of the importance the organized bar attaches to the
work of these committees is the extent to which the opinions are published and the
ease with which they can be accessed. See Zacharias, supra note 32, at 238 n.45.
The full texts of the opinions are published in The NationalReporteron Legal Ethics
and ProfessionalResponsibility, on bar association web sites, and in the Westlaw and
Lexis electronic databases. The ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on ProfessionalConduct
reprints the full text of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
and a synopsis of state and local opinions.
In addition, there are specialized
treatises devoted to the opinions. E.g., THE NEW YORK CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: OPINIONS, COMMENTARY, AND CASELAW (Mary C. Daly ed. 1997 & 1999
Supp.).
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professional responsibility as a special, carve-out topic. Viewed as
a whole, these activities stress the importance of knowledge of the
rules of ethics.
In addition to the ABA and state and local bar associations, the
ALI has also contributed significantly to the transformation from
standards to rules. 13 8 Continuously over the course of the last
thirteen years, the ALl has brought together leading scholars,
judges, and practicing lawyers for the purposes of drafting the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. 13 9 This task has not
been an easy one. Their proposals have received wide-spread
publicity and have been scrutinized by academics, bar groups, and
lawyers from all practice settings. 140 By its very existence, the ALl
project reflects the fact of the transformation. After all, it is engaged
in restatingthe law, not standards. 14 1 Even Professor Wolfram, the
Reporter of the Restatement, has expressed a certain uneasiness
with its rules' schema. 1 42 He has warned that the Restatement "will
and should disturb those who are concerned with legal ethics"
because it omits "every sort of normative statement or quality
ascription that one might apply to the actions of a lawyer or law firm
143
except narrowly legal statements or ascriptions."

III. WHY

A

SIMILAR TRANSFORMATION HAS NOT OCCURRED

IN THE CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES
The thesis elaborated in this article is nuanced. By no stretch
of the imagination does the thesis advance the proposition that non-

138.
See generally Symposium, The American Law Institute: Process,
Partisanship,and the Restatements of Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 567 (1998) (discussing
the role of the American Law Institute and the Restatements in the development of
American law).
139.
See Latto, supranote 83, at 699-700.
140.
See, e.g., Symposium, Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 10 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 541 (1997); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Under the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 19 J. Corp. L. 1 (1993); Latto, supranote
83; Fred C. Zacharias, Fact and Fiction in the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers: Should th¢e Confidentiality Provisions Restate the Law?, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 903 (1993).

141. The Director of the ALl is Geoffrey C. Hazard, one of the most
distinguished academics in the United States in the field of professional
responsibility. In his Foreword to the Proposed Final Draft No. 1, Professor Hazard
acknowledges the rule-like character of the MODEL CODE and MODEL RULES. See
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS xdi-xxiii (Proposed Final Draft No. 1
1996). See also Zacharias, supra note 32, at 223 ("Over time, the professional codes
governing lawyer behavior have become statutory in form. Modem codes increasingly
tell lawyers how they must act.").
142. See Charles W. Wolfram, Legal Ethics and the Restatement Process-The
Sometimes-Uncomfortable Fit,46 OKLA. L. REV. 13, 13 (1993).
143. Id.
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U.S.-trained lawyers are unethical or even insensitive to ethical
issues. It argues rather that the standards and rules of legal
ethics 14 are not as central to the identity and training of legal
professionals in the civil law countries as they are in the United
States. In certain respects, this assertion rests on negative
inferences drawn from observations about foreign legal education,
litigation, and disciplinary systems.
As discussed above,
professional responsibility is a "crown jewel" of the U.S. legal
system. It is taught in law schools, fought over in the courts, and
enforced
through
court-supervised
agencies
staffed
by
professionals.'14
Legal ethics does not occupy this privileged
146
position in other parts of the world.

A. Legal Education and ProfessionalTraining
The legal education of almost all foreign lawyers begins at the
14 7
university level, where law is taught as an undergraduate major.
The overwhelming majority of graduates who earn a degree in law do

144.
See supranotes 22-31, 32-36 and accompanying text.
145.
Of course, in the real world, the "crown jewel" is blemished. Too often
lawyers ignore professional codes of conduct or fail to interpret them correctly; courts
overlook ethical violations; disciplinary authorities are understaffed and
underfunded; and some law schools still send the wrong message about the subject's
importance by assigning professional responsibility courses to junior or adjunct
faculty who fail to teach with the appropriate degree of academic rigor.
146.
I am deliberately excluding from the scope of this essay any observations
about the codes of conduct that govern lawyers licensed to practice in the Eastern
European countries and the member states of the Confederation of Independent
States. The professional challenges faced by lawyers in these countries merits a
separate article. See, e.g., Lisa A. Granik, Legal Educationin Post-Soviet Russia and
Ukraine, 72 OR. L. REv. 963 (1993); William D. Meyer, Facing the Post-Communist
Reality: Lawyers in PrivatePracticein Centraland EasternEurope and the Republics of
the FormerSoviet Union, 26 LAw & PoL' INTIL Bus. 1019 (1995); Andras Sajo, The Role
of Lawyers in Social Change: Hungary, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. 137 (1993). For
a fascinating account of the drafting of a lawyer's code of conduct in an Eastern
European country, see Ronald D. Rotunda, Legal Ethics, The Czech Republic and the
Rule ofLaw, 7 PROF. LAw. at 1, Aug. 1996. See also Michael Burrage, Advokatura: In
Search of Professionalismand Pluralism in Moscow and Leningrad, 15 L. & Soc.
INQUIRY 433 (1990); George A. Critchlow, Teaching Law in Transylvania:Notes on
Romanian Legal Education, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157 (1994).
147.
See GLENDON ET AL., supranote 7, at 130-33; RUDOLPH B. SCHESINGER ET
AL., COMPARATIVE LAw (5th ed. 1988); Jutta Brunnde, The Reform of Legal Education
in Germany: The Never-Ending Story and EuropeanIntegration,42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 399,
401 (1992); Francis H. Heller & John C. Peck, American Law Teachers in an Austrian
University: Some Observations Gleanedfrom a Decade of the Kansas-ViennaExchange
Program, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 507, 512 n. 16 (1994); Juergen R. Ostertag, Legal
Education in Germany and the United States-A Structural Comparison,26 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 301 (1993).
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not become practicing lawyers. 148 Most of them pursue careers in
business or government where they make extensive use of their legal
knowledge. 14 9 Undergraduate education in law is almost entirely
theoretical, and practice-related perspectives are largely
unknown. 5 0 Students leave the university with a "facility in the
'grammar of law'. ...

and a nodding familiarity with the practice

aspects of law."1 s l
Given the structure and goals of the
undergraduate program, therefore, it is not surprising to learn that
legal ethics seems to play little or no role in the graduates' education
at most institutions. 1 52 Occasionally, undergraduates pursuing a
law degree may enroll in a deontology course. Deontology, however,
is the theory or study of moral obligation.' 5 3 In spirit and in
substance, it is much closer to a course in jurisprudence in a U.S.
law school than to a course in professional responsibility.
Students who want to become practicing lawyers must pursue

professional training. In some countries, these students begin their

54
professional training after completing their undergraduate degree.1
In other countries, they can enroll in a specialized series of training

148.

See generally Brunn~e, supranote 147, at 400-26.

149.
1 have explored elsewhere how this pool of law-trained graduates has
impacted the delivery of legal services outside the United States. See generally Daly,
supranote 59, at 1100-02. See also LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: AN OvERvIEw 134, 165 n.
25, 299-303 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S. C. Lewis eds., 1995).
150.
See Daly, supranote 59, at 1101.
151.
GLENDON ETAL., supra note 7, at 78.
152. There appears to be no central repository housing the curricula of foreign
law schools. However, I have examined two exhaustive compilations and found no
significant entries to suggest that courses similar to U.S. law school offerings in legal
ethics or professional responsibility are required or even available in most civil law
countries. See THE EUROPEAN LAW STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION, GUIDE TO LEGAL STUDIES IN
EUROPE 1996-1997 (1996); THE LAW ASSOCIATION FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, DIRECTORY
OF LAW COURSES IN THE ASIA AND WEST PACIFIC REGIONS (6th ed. 1997). See also Hilmar
Fenge et al., Legal Educationand Training in Europe: Germany, 2 INTL J. LEGAL PROF.
95 (1995); Tom Latrup-Pedersen, Legal Educationand Training in Europe:Denmark,
2 INTIL J. LEGAL PROF. 79 (1995); Jean-Claude Masclet et al., Legal Education and
Trainingin Europe: France, 2 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 7 (1995); Joe Verhoeven & Henri
Simonart, Legal Educationand Training in Europe:Belgium 2 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 25
(1995).
The Netherlands is an exception to this observation. As part of the advocate's
professional training, the candidate for admission must take a mandatory course in
"rules of conduct." See Jaap E. Doek, Legal Education and Training in Europe: The
Netherlands, 2 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 25, 37-38 (1995). Several German universities
have established the Institute fur Anwaltsrecht (Institute for Lawyer Law) that offers

instruction in legal ethics as a component substantive law offerings. See Letter from
Laurel S. Terry to Mary C. Daly (Feb. 15, 1999) (on file with the author). In Professor
Terry's view, professional responsibility instruction "is a continuum, Europe is behind
us, but moving in our direction...." Id.
153.
See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (15th ed. 1994).
See generally
Symposium, Legal Ethics in Europe, 4 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 5 (1997).
154.
See Daly, supranote 59, at 1101.
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courses after two or more years of undergraduate education.1 5 5
Thus, whatever study of legal ethics takes place usually occurs
during the period of the students' professional training. The
influence of the bar over the structure and content of the
professional training stage is generally far greater than that of the
university.' 5 6 Comparatively little or no academic energy is spent
in
instructing future lawyers
about their
professional
responsibilities. The absence of such instruction sends a clear
message about the importance the scholarly community attaches to
the subject matter, as does the absence of treatises and journals
devoted to it. Moreover, these absences rob the legal profession of
a powerful tool for reflection, self-evaluation, and, if needed, reform.
The U.S. legal academic community has made weighty contributions
to the debates on the role of lawyers in society and the rules that
should govern their conduct. Significantly, it has made these
contributions by serving the profession both as an "outside
agitator," for example, Professor Freedman's work on the ethical
dilemmas of criminal defense lawyers' S7 and as "inside advisor," for
example, the work of Professors Morgan, Leubsdorf, and Wolfram as
reporters for the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, and
Professor Hazard as a reporter for the Special Commission on
Professional Standards.' 5 8 Moreover, the presence of professional
responsibility teachers in the classroom during law students'
formative years contributes to a healthy skepticism about and
questioning of the legal profession's sometimes too lofty rhetoric in
defense of its own self-interest.
This skepticism and questioning appears to be lacking during
the period of professional training of foreign lawyers. "Ethics"
training seems to be sporadic and primarily concerned with
technical code provisions relating to record keeping, mandatory
insurance requirements, and the application of mandatory fee

155.
See generally CHRISTIAN DADOMO & SUSAN FARRAN, THE FRENCH LEGAL
SYSTEM 115-16 (1993); 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD (Richard L. Abel
& Philip S. C. Lewis 1988); THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS IN THE NEW EUROPE (Alan Tyrrell
& Zahid Yaqub eds. 1993); Brunn~e, supranote 147, at 400-26; Ostertag, supra note
147, at 301.
156.
See generally Symposium, Legal Education and Trainingin Europe,2 INTL
J. LEGAL PROF. 5 (1995).
157.
See Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966). For an
appreciation of Professor Freedman's contributions, see Charles W. Wolfram, The U.S.
Law of Client Confidentiality: Frameworkfor an InternationalPerspective in RIGHTS,
LIABILITY, AND ETHICS, supra note 12, at 141-45.
158.
See supranotes 138-43 (discussing the Restatement) and WOLFRAM, supra
note 38, § 2.6.4, at 60-63 (discussing the contribution of the Special Commission to
the drafting of drafting the Model Rules).
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schedules.1 5 9 One noted German commentator observed in 1997,
"German advocates tend to know little about professional and
particularly ethical rules ... ."160
B. The Effect of the Divided Structure of the Legal Profession

How the rules/standards dichotomy influences the perception
of codes of lawyer conduct is not fully understandable without an
appreciation of the divided structure of the legal profession and the
geographic and jurisdictional limitations on the right to practice
commonly found in the civil law countries. As a distinguished
sociologist of the legal profession has insisted, context is the
"deciding influence [on codes of lawyer conduct]. In the European

context there is a clear division between the civil law and common
law countries and the different approaches that each [has] to rules
of conduct and the business of professional discipline." 16 1 There is
no single "legal profession" in most civil law countries.
The
functions typically associated with the practice of law in the United
States such as advocacy in court, counseling on business
transactions, and facilitating the transfer of real and personal
property are generally divided among at least three different
categories of legal professions: (1) those with the "right of audience"
who may represent clients in court (e.g., advocats in France,
dikigorosin Greece, and rechtsanwaltsin Germany); 16 2 (2) those who

159.
See Symposium, supranote 153 (passim).
160.
Ulkrike Schultz, Legal Ethics in Germany, 4 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 55, 77
(1997). Professor Terry has expressed some reservations about the breadth of
Schultz's comment. In Professor Terry's view, German lawyers are more aware of
their ethical obligations than Schultz suggests. See Letter of Laurel S. Terry, supra
note 152.
An observation similar to Schultz's has been made about legal education in the
United Kingdom:
[T]he majority of legal practitioners and law students in America "groan" when
the subject of ethics comes up. In England there is no groaning for one
primary reason, the topic of legal ethics is rarely debated. Whilst lawyers and
academics in the United States write, read, study, and discuss their legal
ethics extensively, in Great Britain there is almost no professional or
academic literature concerning legal ethics. The only ethics offering I could
discover at any English university was a single course and the topic was
concerning United States legal ethics. In researching for this paper I went to
all the major law bookshops and libraries in London only to find the cupboard
was bare.
Karen L.K. Miller, Zp to Nil?: A Comparison of American and English Launjers'

Standardsof ProfessionalConduct, CA32 ALI-ABA 199, 208 (1995).
16 1. Avrom Sherr, Dinners,Library Seats, Wigs and Relatives, 4

INT'L J. LEGAL

PROF. 5, 6 (1997).
162.
See Anne Boigeol, The FrenchBar: The Difficulties of Unifying a Divided
Profession, in 2 LAWYERS IN SOcIETY: THE CIvIL LAw WORLD, supranote 155, at 259;
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advise on and document the transfer of real and personal property
(e.g., notaires in France, Italy, and Spain);16 3 and (3) those who
counsel clients on business transactions (e.g., the former avouees
and conseil juridique in France). 164 Consequently, at least two or
more codes of conduct separately govern the conduct of legal
professionals within each country. 165 What is commonly referred to
as a "lawyer's code of conduct" is generally the code applicable only
to a lawyer with the right of audience. Furthermore, its contents are
often vague. For example, in France, the rules of professional
conduct "are nowhere as finely tuned as those in effect in the United

Takis Kommatas, The Legal Profession in Greece, inTHE LEGAL PROFESSIONS INTHE NEW
EUROPE, supranote 155, at 154; Gerhard Manz & Susan Padman-Reich, The Legal
Professionin Germany, inTHE LEGAL PROFESSIONS INTHE NEW EUROPE, supra note 155,
at 131.
163.
See THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM, supranote 155, at 125-29; Luis Algor
Cableran, The Legal Professions in Spain, in THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS IN THE NEW
EUROPE, supranote 155, at 280-99; Rem Danovi, The Legal Professionsin Italy, in THE
LEGAL PROFESSIONS INTHE NEW EUROPE, supranote 155, at 193-211; Pierre Sanglade,
The Legal Professions in France, in THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS INTHE NEW EUROPE, supra
note 155; 116-29 (discussing the legal profession in France); Pedro A. Malavet,
Counselfor the Situation: The Latin Notary, A Historicaland Comparative Model, 19
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 389 (1996). See also Stewart Baker & Theodore
Barassi, The InternationalNotarialPractitioner,24 A.B.A. INT'L L. NEWS, Fall 1995, at
1.
164.
See THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM, supranote 155, at 127-29; Haimo Schack,
PrivateLawyers in Contemporary Society: Germany, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 187,

188-90 (1993); Ronald P. Sokol, Reforming the FrenchLegal Profession,26 INTL LAW.

1025 (1992); Terry, PartI, supranote 12, at 10-11 (discussing the legal profession in
Austria). Recent reforms in France resulted in the consolidation of the avoue, consell
juridique,and advocat into the single profession of "avocaL" See generally 2 LAWYERS
IN SoCIETY: THE CML LAW WORLD, supranote 155; THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS IN THE NEW

EUROPE, supra note 155. However, despite the single title, in the day-to-day practice
of law, the distinction between a legal professional who advises businesses on a wide
range of commercial matters and the legal professional with a right of audience has
not been disturbed. See THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM, supranote 155, at 122-23, 128.
For an excellent introduction to the sociological importance of these distinctions, see
Trubek, et al., supra note 134; see alsoAbel, TransnationalLegal Practice,supra note
134.
165. In comparing the duty of loyalty in the U.S. and French legal systems, one
commentator noted that "in France the work done by U.S. lawyers is done by eight
different professions, including the profession of notaire." Olivier d'Ormesson, French
Perspectives on the Duty of Loyalty: Comparisonswith the American View, in RIGHTS,
LIABILITY, AND ETHICS, supranote 12, at 29. He went on to point out that:
[t]he Code of Conduct governing the notarial attorneys has no specific
provisions on conflicts of interest. The notarial attorney simply has to put the
interest of his client before his own interest. That is a very general notion,
and it does not provide and precise guidance on conflicts of interest. Thus,
it is quite common for notarial attorneys in France to represent in the same
transaction the seller and the buyer with different and opposing interests.
Id. at 30.
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States, which still boasts the most developed professional conduct
rules in the world." 16 6 In the close-knit legal communities of the
civil law countries, an individual lawyer's decision about how to
resolve an ethical dilemma is generally respected-or at least not
formally challenged-by the lawyer's "brothers and sisters at the
bar."16 7 Perfectly capturing the spirit of this professional culture is
the observation "conflicts are a matter of [personal] ethics, not law.
168
Conflicts are a matter of your relationship with your client."
Identifying the controlling norms for these lawyers is not an
easy task. In some countries, the rules of professional conduct "are
handed down from generation to generation as some kind of 'oral
law', uncodified and restricted to prohibitions of the most obvious
conflicts of interest." 169 In others, such as Italy, the rules of
professional conduct "are not clearly specified in any code or statute
but are based on a combination of laws, ethical principles, and
accepted professional practice." 170 In Mexico, no code exists to
govern the conduct of all lawyers admitted to practice in that
country. 17 1 Although the Mexican Bar Association has adopted a
code of professional ethics, it governs only the conduct of lawyers
who join that voluntary organization and does not have the force of
law. 172

Not only is membership in the legal profession in the civil law
countries divided by function, 17 3 but until recently territorial and
jurisdictional limitations were also common in the member states of
the European Union, restricting where and in what courts a lawyer
could litigate. From a market perspective, these limitations impeded

166. Phillippe Sarrailhe, Application of Professional Conduct Rules in
TransnationalAffairs, in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, PRIVATE INVESTMENTS
ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS ININTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1995 2-7 (1995).

167.

See infra note 200 and accompanying text.

168. Justin Castillo, InternationalLaw Practice in the 1990s: Issues of Law,
Policy, and ProfessionalEthics, 86 AM. SocY' INT'L L. PROC. 272, 283 (1992).
169. Ivo CAYTAs, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 19 (1992). Knowledgeable commentators have made
similar observations about the United Kingdom. See Miller, supranote 160, at 217
("English lawyers' ethics are largely unarticulated, they are not rules, rather
standards, and even the standards may not be formally expressed.").
170. Stefano Agostini, Advertising and Solicitation:A ComparativeAnalysis of
Why Italian and American Lawyers Approach Their ProfessionDifferently, 10 TEMP.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 329, 337 (1996). While the author characterizes the combination
as rules, they are actually standardsin the context of this article.
171. See Rona R. Mears, Ethics and Due Diligence:A Lawyer's Perspective on
Doing Business with Mexico, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 605, 611 (1991).
172. See id.
173. See generally Leny E. De Groot-Van Leeuwen, Polishingthe Bar: The Legal
Ethics Code and DisciplinarySystem of the Netherlands, and a Comparisonwith the
United States, 4 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 9, 10 (1997); Vittorio Olgiati, Self-Regulation of
Legal Professions in Contemporary Italy, 4 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 89, 91-95 (1997);
Schultz, supranote 160, at 55-56.
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the expansion of individual lawyers' practices and discouraged the
growth of law firms. 1 74 From a cultural perspective, they created
mini-communities of lawyers with strong fraternal ties to one
another. Traditionally, admission to the bar in a civil law country
did not permit a lawyer to exercise his profession throughout a
country or in all of its courts. A lawyer was admitted to a particular
bar (e.g., the bar of Paris or the bar of Hamburg) and the
requirement of singular admission often confined the lawyer's
75
services to a single court (e.g., trial or first appellate level).'
Partnership among lawyers admitted to different bars was
discouraged or even forbidden, making the establishment of national
law firms virtually impossible. 1 76 Many of these restrictions recently
have been repealed or rescinded in response to the decisions of the
European Court of Justice that facilitated the cross-border delivery
of legal services. 17 7 The German Constitutional Court has also

played an important role in loosing the stranglehold of the principal
of locality. 17 8 The practical effect of these decisions was to exempt

174.
Even though there are territorial and jurisdictional limitations on the
practice of law in the United States, they have not had the same effect. The ABA
Committee on Professional Ethics played a key role in facilitating the growth of
interstate law firms. See Mary C. Daly, Resolving Ethical Conflicts in MultiJurisdictionalPractice-IsModel Rule 8.5 The Answer, An Answer or No Answer At AlIP,
36 S. Tx. L. REV. 715, 743-45 (1995). See also Galanter & Palay, supranote 57.
175.
See generallyAndreas G. Junius, The German System, in RIGHTS, LIABILITY,
AND ETHICS, supra note 12, at 59-60 (describing the localization requirement, the
singular admission requirement, the residence requirement, and the law office
requirement).
Lawyers in Italy were forbidden to practice in partnerships, a restriction
176.
that clearly impeded the establishment of national law firms. See infra, note 181.
A ban on branch offices and on national partnerships accomplished a similar result
in Germany. See Junius, supranote 175, at 60.
177.
See Case 107/83, Ordre des Avocats au Barreau de Paris v. Rechtsanwalt
Klopp, 1984 E.C.R. 2971, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 99 (1984) (holding invalid France's
limiting lawyer's right of establishment to single Member State); Case 33/74, J. H.
M. van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid,
1974 E.C.R. 1299, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298 (1974) (holding that lawyers could directly
rely on the EC Treaty provisions relating to establishment (Article 52) and services
(Article 59) without need for implementing legislation); Jean Reyners v. Belgium, Case
2/74, 1974 E.C.R. 631 [19741, 1974 2 C.M.L.R. 305 (1974) (holding that Article 55's
exception for activities relating to "the exercise of official authority" does not permit
Member States to deny right of establishment without exception to lawyers from
other Member States). For a comprehensive overview of the French rule that was
struck down see Jeffrey Mendelsohn, Recent Development European Court of Justice:
ParisBar Rule Violates Right of Establishment, 26 HARV. INTL L.J. 562, 562-68 (1985).
See also Philippe Watson, Annotation, Case 107/83 Ordre des Avocats au Barreau
de Paris v. Onno Klopp, Judgment of 12 July, 1984, 22 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 736
(1985).
178.
See generallyWolgan Kuhn, DramaticDevelopments in the Legal Profession
in the FederalRepublic of Germany, 14 INTL LEGAL PRAc. 94 (1989). See also Wolfgang
Kuhn, New ProfessionalRules forAttorneys in Germany: The EuropeanCourt and the
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lawyers licensed in one member state, the home state, from the
residence and law office requirements of another member state, the
host state. These decisions, of course, put the host state lawyers at
a competitive disadvantage. A German-national lawyer admitted to
the bar of Hamburg, for example, could provide legal services in
Paris and Lyons, but not in Bremen. A French-national lawyer
admitted to the bar of Paris could provide legal services in Hamburg,
but not in Lyons. To establish a level playing field between national
and foreign lawyers, many licensing authorities abolished these
traditional practice restrictions, thereby allowing a lawyer to be
admitted to the bar of more than one jurisdiction within the member
state of which he was a national. The abolition encouraged the
rapid expansion of law firms both within the member states and
across their borders.
The divided structure and the tenitorial restrictions obviously
had a significant economic impact by limiting the markets in which
legal professionals could offer services. Highly restrictive rules on
advertising further limited client development. 179 Moreover, the
doctrine of incompatible professions acted as an entrepreneurial
straightjacket. The doctrine prohibited legal professionals from
engaging in any commercial activity that would detract from their
standing as a member of a liberal profession. In most countries, the
doctrine effectively barred lawyers from having an active ownership
interest in any business or being an employee of any business.'1 0
The cumulative effect of the different restraints was to shrink

FederalConstitutionalCourt Shake the Profession, 14 INTIL LEGAL PRAC. 48, 51 (1989).
For a detailed description of the changes in Germany, see Roger G. Goebel, Lawyers
in the European Community: ProgressToward Community-Wide Rights of Practice,in,
RIGHTS, LIABILITY AND ETHIcS, supranote 12, at 244-45, 259-61; Chris Darbyshire,

Frankfurt:The Next Outpost of Angio-Saxon Empires, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Feb. 1991, at
17.
179. See De Groot-Van Leeuwen, supra note 173, at 12; Lauren Dobrowalski,
Maintaining the Dignity of the Profession: An International Perspective on Lawyer
Advertising and Solicitation, 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 367 (1994); Schultz, supra note 160,
at 63. See also LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra note 8, at 85 (Germany); Agostini,
supranote 170, at 343; Louise L. Hill, Lawyer Publicity in the European Union: Bans
Are Removed but BarriersRemain, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 381,383 (1995);
Albert Tanghe, Publish and Be Damned - Local Bar PublicityRestrictions, 1 L. IN EUR.
3 (1990). See generally Barbara Galli, ItalianFirms Face ForeignInvasion, INT'L FIN.
L. REV., May 1998, at 32, 33; Robert Lever, American Attorneys in Paris, NAT'L L.J.,
June 22, 1987, at 1, 42; Sarah Marks, FinnishLawyers Face up to Competition, Intl
Fin. L. Rev., May 1995, at 20, 21; Samantha Wigham; Foreign Influence Pushes
German Lawyers into New Mergers, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Jan. 1997, at 41, 43; Austria Bar

Dispute, INT'L FIN. L. REV., June 1994, at 3.

180,

See Agostini, supra note 170, at 336-37; Daly, supra note 59, at 1097-99;

Schultz, supranote 160, at 66, 68.
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considerably the opportunities available to legal professionals to

develop and expand their practices. 18 1
In sum, the divided structure of the legal profession and the
various territorial and jurisdictional restrictions combined in the
civil law countries to create mini-communities of practitioners with
strong fraternal bonds. As Professor Rose has pointed out, choosing
between standards and rules is to some extent deciding how to treat
members of an immediate community and strangers. 8 2 Since it
was virtually impossible until recently for "strangers"-either foreign
or domestic-to practice in these mini-communities, standards
sufficed to guide ethical decisionmaking. Over the course of time,
as the courts and licensing authorities lowered the entry barriers,
more "strangers" disrupted those communities." In significant
measure, the adoption of the CCBE Code of Conduct is a rule-like
183
response to the strangers' presence.
C. The Conduct of Litigation
Just as legal ethics does not occupy a privileged position in the
curricula of foreign law schools, neither does it occupy a privileged
position in the litigation of disputes in foreign courts. For better or for
worse, lawyers in the United States routinely invoke the rules of
professional responsibility in myriads of state and federal court cases.
Motions to disqualify based on alleged conflicts of interests are the
most obvious example of the rules' pronounced presence in the
litigation process. Courts regularly struggle with the prohibitions
against simultaneous and successive adverse representation. Issues
involving the ethical duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client
privilege draw their attention as well. Fee disputes trigger the judicial
analysis of the rules governing contingent fee arrangements, the
requirement of reasonableness, and the limitations on fee-splitting.
The list could go on and on. The important point, however, is that
these issues are brought before judges for resolution and that the
judges' decisions are public records, frequently accessible in
published caselaw reporters and electronic retrieval systems, and
even on the Internet.

181.

Other restrictions also contributed to limiting the opportunities.

For

example, in Italy lawyers may only form "professional associations," not partnerships,

and only individual laIvyers, not law firms, may provide legal services. See Agostini,
supranote 170, at 335-36. A survey of Italian law firms in 1993 revealed that only
five firms had more than forty lawyers and only ten had more than twenty. Sandra
Burke, Italy: Triumph of the Tiny Firm, LAW. INT'L, Mar. 1993, at 12.
182.
See Rose, supranote 4, at 60 1-05.
183.
See infra notes 218-33 and accompanying text.
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The civil law tradition is, of course, inquisitorial not adversarial.
For the purposes of this article, the distinction between the two rests
in how the courts resolve disputes. In the civil law tradition, the
judge dominates the courtroom proceedings, often taking testimony
directly from witnesses with limited or no questioning by the parties'
lawyers. Testimony in the form of affidavits is also common. There
is no proceeding analogous to a motion to disqualify. Complaints
about the conduct of lawyers are regarded as matters for discipline
by the bar, not for judicial relief by the courts. Comparatively few
issues regarding the ethical duty of confidentiality are ever raised
because the judges' oral questioning and the affidavits are more
circumscribed than lawyers' questioning of witnesses in the United
States. Witness preparation as conducted in U.S. litigation is
virtually non-existent.' 8 4 Conflicts of interest issues are resolved by
the bar associations, not the courts. 18 5 Disputes over fees from a
comparative perspective are few and far between. As was the case
in the United States before Goldfarb,8 6 local or national bar
associations frequently adopt fee schedules.' 8 7 In some instances,
deviations are not permitted. In others, the schedule is merely
advisory; however, the universal practice in the legal community is
not to depart from it. In a system of fixed fees, disputes are less
likely.' 8 8 Moreover, fee disputes too are often the province of bar
8 9
discipline not the judiciary.'
Inextricably intertwined with these differences is the relative
absence of a rules-like jurisprudence of malpractice or breach of
fiduciary duty. In 1995, the International Bar Association published
the results of an extensive survey it had conducted into the
malpractice regimes of approximately fifty-nine jurisdictions around
the world. 1 90 That survey showed that until recently malpractice

184. This is also true in the common law countries, as the following vignette
illustrates.
During a recent visit to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, I met one of the staff lawyers who explained that in discussing
preparation of the witnesses for cross-examination during trial several
lawyers from different countries expressed opposing views on the ethics
questions involved. An Australian lawyer felt that from his perspective it
would be unethical to prepare a witness; a Canadian lawyer said it would be
illegal; and an American lawyer's view was that not to prepare a witness
would be malpractice.
Miller, supranote 160, at 204.
185. See d'Ormesson, supranote 165, at 31.
186. 421 U.S. at 773. See supranotes 99-103 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Agostini, supranote 170, at 340-41.
188. See Schultz, supranote 160, at 60.
189. See, e.g., Agostini, supranote 170, at 338-39.
190.
See LIABILITY OF LAWYERS AND INDEMNITY INSURANCE 75-240 (Albert Rogers
et al. eds. 1995).
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claims against lawyers were extremely rare in the civil law
countries,' 9 1 a situation still true in some South American and
Eastern.European countries, 192 but less so in other parts of the
world.
Nonetheless the survey concluded that "[p]rofessional
liability is still a relatively new subject, that is to say as a subject of
legal publications and case law." 193 To the extent they exist,
malpractice claims in civil law countries usually have been confined
to relatively straightforward acts of negligence, such as the failure
to file an action before the expiration of the statute of limitations.
The development of the law, moreover, has been hindered by the
unwillingness of lawyers to testify against one another. 19 4 Finally,
civil law countries lack a developed malpractice regime not only
because of a general cultural reluctance on clients' part to sue
lawyers but also because in many countries, unlike the United
States, lawyers may ethically limit their liability to clients. 195
Furthermore, since malpractice insurance is required in many
jurisdictions, 19 6 it may be that claims are settled without the need
for judicial intervention.

The appropriate role of the codes of lawyer conduct in
malpractice actions in the United States is the subject of dispute.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Rules influence the

development of the law of malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty
either directly, as, for example, when a court admits expert
191.
See id.
192.
See id. at 15.
193.
Id. at 25.
194.
See Sarralihe, supranote 166, at 2-8. Furthermore, in some jurisdictions,
a lawyer may not commence a malpractice action against another lawyer without the
approval of the bar association that has disciplinary authority over the targeted
defendant-lawyer. See id.
195.
See, e.g., LIABILITY OF LAWYERS AND INDEMNITY INSURANCE, supranote 190,
at 108 (Ecuador); id. at 134 (Guatemala); id. at 159 (Luxembourg). As the survey
makes clear, limitations on liability although theoretically available may not in fact
be used by lawyers. In other countries, the legal status of such limitations may be
unclear. See, e.g., id. at 129-30 (Germany).
196.
See id.
Malpractice insurance is arguably mandatory in all EU
jurisdictions in those situations in which an EU lawyer interacts with a lawyer from
a different EU country or a CCBE Observer State. As Professor Terry has pointed
out, the mandatory malpractice insurance requirement was one of the few new
substantive requirements established in the CCBE Code. Terry, PartI, supra note 12,
at n. 145. The qualifier "arguablymandatory" is appropriate because the CCBE has,
in fact, no direct authority to issue binding regulations. Compare id. at 35 ("thus, by
agreeing to adopt the CCBE's rule, transforming the CCBE recommendation for
malpractice insurance into a mandatory requirement each member of the CCBE has
agreed to adopt for its cross-border practice situations a mandatory malpractice
insurance requirement."), with id. at 11-12 (explaining that the CCBE lacks authority
to adopt a binding code, that the CCBE Code signatories agreed to adopt the Code
in their countries, and that the methods of adoption and their enforceability differ
among CCBE Member States).
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testimony about the Rules' scope and content, or indirectly, as, for
example, when a court permits an expert to rely on the Rules as a
component of a duty of reasonable care. 1 97 Up until now, the
malpractice catalyst has been missing in the civil law countries,
although that may be changing.
D. The Lawyer DisciplinarySystem
The regulatory system for lawyer discipline in most civil law
countries resembles that which prevailed in the United States before
the states implemented the Clark Commission reforms. 1 98 No
independent agency is charged with investigating or prosecuting
lawyer misconduct. Rather, enforcement responsibility is vested in
the local bar association. Just as lawyers are admitted to practice
within a local judicial district, the bar association for the local
judicial district is charged with policing its members' conduct. 19 9
One commentator describing the system of lawyer discipline in
France has aptly captured the difference between the civil law
countries and the United States:
These [disciplinary] proceedings are, as a general rule, heard in
chambers; the French Bar considers such affairs to be ntemal,'
thereby emphasizing the mutual protection of the members. This

stems from the 'brotherhood' principle, and is in direct contrast to the
transparency of the various American state bars....
[C]omplaints against a lawyer are treated as a family affair ....

200

Moreover, the president of the local bar association often plays a
critical role in the lawyer disciplinary system. 2 0 1 A highly respected
member of the bar distinguished by his reputation for integrity and
honesty, the president possesses a unique moral authority within
the local legal community. For example, in the Netherlands,
Complaints about lawyers concern all kinds of aspects of their legal
services, such as financial wrongdoings, non-appearance in court or
In Dutch procedure complaints are filed
ignoring of deadlines ....

197.

See generally RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE

14.4 (4th ed. 1996 & Supp. 1998) (stating "where fiduciary breaches are involved,
disciplinary rules may be persuasive regarding the basic standard governing ethical
conduct.").
198.
See supranotes 90-98 and accompanying text.
199.
See THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 155, at 119-20; THE LEGAL
PROFESSIONS IN THE NEW EUROPE, supranote 155, at 196, 199-200, 205-07 (Italy), 286-

87 (Spain); 123-24 (France); Agostini, supra note 170, at 331-33, 337-38; Christian
Raoult, The French System, in RIGHTS, LIABILITY, AND ETHICS, supranote 12, at 54-56.
200.
See Sarrailhe, supra note 166, at 2-8. While the commentator notes the
transparency of the U.S. system, it should be noted that in many states, the
disciplinary authorities conduct the initial investigation and fact finding in secret.
See THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS IN THE NEW EUROPE, supra note 155, at 74,
201.
119, 125, 127, 256-57; Geoffrey Hazard, Taking FrenchLessons, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 17,
1995, at A21; Raoult, supra note 199, at 55-56.
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with the Bar Association's presidents of the legal districts, who
operate as a first sieve. A president may try to reach a settlement or
appease parties in other informal ways ....
Yearly reports of the Bar
Association of the Netherlands indicate that during the 1990/1993 75
202
to 90% of the filed complaints were dealt with by presidents.

The executive committee of the Chamber of Advocates in Germany
3
performs a similar role.

20

IV. How AN

UNDERSTANDING OF THE STANDARDS/RULES
DICHOTOMY CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE CREATION OF A
CROSS-BORDER CODE OF LAWYER CONDUCT

As goods, services, and capital move at an ever-accelerating
pace across national borders and around the globe, contacts
between lawyers trained in different legal traditions are
correspondingly on the rise. While the mega law firms in the United
States and the United Kingdom presently dominate cross-border
practice in terms of the revenue they generate, 20 4 smaller law firms
and corporate counsel employed by organizations of all sizes are
increasingly being asked by their clients for legal advice relating to
the production, sale, and purchase of goods and services in other
countries. 20 5 To represent their clients competently, U.S. lawyers
must appreciate that their foreign opposing counsel and even the
foreign lawyers retained to represent their clients 20 6 are likely to

202.
See De Groot-Van Leeuwen, supra note 173, at 14.
203.
See Schultz, supranote 160, at 75-76.
204.
See Paul Lee, Setting the Law FirmStandard,INTL FIN. L. REv., Nov. 1997,
at 16 (examining the international strategies at the fifty largest law firms); John
McGrath, Global Law and the English Lawyer, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Aug. 1994, at 23
(discussing international expansion for London lawyers); John E. Morris, The Global
50, AM. LAW., Nov. 1998, at 45, 47(charting the top law firms by revenue);
InternationalFirms Outperform Domestic Rivals, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Oct. 1996, at 16
(arguing that law firms with substantial international practices are more profitable
than law firms without them).
205.
See Ronald A. Brand, Professional Responsibility in a Transnational
Transactions Practice, 17 J.L. & COM. 301, 313 (1998) (discussing special legal
problems faced by in-house counsel); Daly, supra note 59, at 1065-66; Mary C. Daly,
PracticingAcross Borders:Ethical Reflectionsfor Small-Firm and Solo Practitioners,in
1995 SYMPOSIUM ISSUE OF THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 123 (1995).
206.
See generally Robert W. Hillman, ProvidingEffective Legal Representation
in InternationalBusiness Transactions,19 INTL LAW. 3, 11-17 (1985) (examining how
business lawyers can provide competent representation in transactions involving
foreign law); M.W. Janis, The Lawyer's Responsibility for ForeignLaw and Foreign
Lawyers, 16 INT'L LAW. 693, 698-704 (1982); Robert E. Lutz, American Perspectives
on the Duty of Competence: Special Problems and Risks In Advising on ForeignLaw, in
RIGHTS, LIABILITY, AND ETHICS, supra note 12, at 81.
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possess fundamentally different perceptions of codes of lawyer
conduct.
The importance of this understanding transcends individual

instances of cooperation among lawyers trained in different legal
systems. As noted earlier, the WTO takes a dim view of provisions
in professional standards that act as barriers to the free movement
of goods and services across national borders. 20 7 A general
consensus exists among the bar associations of the industrialized
countries that the legal profession should adopt a common code of
conduct for lawyers engaged in cross-border practice before the WTO
prunes the existing ones and discards the ethical provisions it
considers to be "trade-barrier" norms.
While significant
disagreement may exist among the members of the legal professions
in different countries on the scope and content of a given ethical
value, such as conffict-free representation, approval or disapproval
of
contingent-fee
representation,
and
without-prejudice
communications, there is agreement that the role the legal
profession plays in checking the power of the state and in ordering
private relationships is too important to be left in the hands of trade
officials (no matter how well intentioned they are or how frequently
they publicly acknowledge the contribution of lawyers to a
democratic society).
On three separate occasions, the members of the international
legal community have attempted to create such a code of conduct.
In 1956, the International Bar Association (IBA) adopted The IBA
International Code of Ethics (IBA Code). 20 8 The document falls
clearly on the standards side of the standards/rules dichotomy. To
begin with, the IBA Code possesses no law-like characteristics. The
IBA is a federation of national bar associations and law societies, not
a licensing body.20 9 Although the IBA Code purports to apply "to any
lawyer of one jurisdiction in relation to his contacts with a lawyer of
another jurisdiction or to his activities in another jurisdiction,"21 0 it
enjoys no police power whatsoever. The police power to which it lays
claim is purely derivative.
If infractions are reported, "[tihe
International Bar Association may bring incidents of alleged
violations to the attention of relevant [disciplinary authorities]." 2 1 1
As the preamble makes clear, the IBA Code is simply "a guide as to
what the International Bar Association considers to be a desirable

207.
See supranotes 9-11 and accompanying text.
208.
See LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supranote 8, at 360-64.
209. The ABA is not a licensing body either. However, the ABA has played a
much larger role in the articulation and adoption of professional standards in each
of the fifty states than the IBA has played in the countries whose bar associations

and law societies are IBA members.
210.
211.

LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supranote 8, at 360.
Id.
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course of conduct by all lawyers engaged in the international
practice of law."2 1 2 Consisting of twenty-one "Rules," the IBA Code
is essentially a statement of norms evidencing a professional culture
2 13
similar to that found in the 1908 Canons and the Model Code.
Lawyers are admonished to "maintain the honour and dignity of
their profession . . . treat their professional colleagues with the
utmost courtesy and fairness ....
Give clients a candid opinion on
any case... never stir up litigation .. .214
The IBA Code contains
no provision relating to conflicts of interest other than a general
admonition that "[1]awyers shall preserve independence in the
discharge of their professional duty."2 15 The IBA Code never
achieved a status other than that of an aspirational statement of
norms intended to guide decisionmaking by lawyers engaged in
cross-border practice.
The international legal community made a second feeble
attempt at creating a cross-border code of conduct in 1977 when the
CCBE issued The Declaration of Perugia on the Principles of
Professional Conduct of the Bars and Law Societies of the European
Community (Declaration of Perugia).2 16 The Declaration of Perugia
was linked in style and format with the IBA Code. Consisting of
eight brief ethical pronouncements that were clearly standards by
any measurement, it was
neither a full Code of Conduct, nor a binding set of rules, but a short

discourse on the function of a lawyer in society, on the nature of the
rules of professional conduct, and on some of the more important
relevant principles of ethics such as integrity, confidentiality,
independence, the corporate spirit of the profession and respect for
2 17
the rules of other Bars and Law Societies.

The third and ultimately successful attempt to formalize a set
of ethics rules occurred in 1988 when the CCBE adopted the Code
of Conduct for Lawyers in the European Community (CCBE
Code). 2 18 Because the CCBE Code has been extensively analyzed
elsewhere, 2 19 this article shall only briefly touch upon its history
and organization. As noted earlier, the CCBE is an umbrella
organization comprising of the bars and law societies of the member

212. Id.
213. See CANONS OF ETHICS, supra note 43; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, supranote 18.
214. LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supranote 8, at 361-62.
215. Id. at 361.
216. CCBE COMPENDIUM, supra note 8, ch. 4, at 10-12.
217. Id.
218. For the text of the Code, see RIGHTS, LIABILITY, AND ETHICS, supranote 12
at 379-91; Terry, Part I, supra note 12, at 63-87 (containing the CCBE and
accompanying Explanatory Memorandum).
219. SeeTerry, PartI, supranote 12; Toulmin, supranote 12, at 207.
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states of the European Union. 2 20 The CCBE has representative
status on behalf of the legal profession before the European
Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the European
Court of Human Rights. 22 1 When it became apparent that legal
professionals in the member states would be able to claim the
protection of the guarantees of the movement of persons and
services established in the Treaty of Rome, the lawyers who engaged
in cross-border practice realized that there was no accepted answer
to the troubling question, "which member state's code of ethics
should be applied, if a lawyer is providing services in a jurisdiction
where the lawyer is not licensed to practice law?" Rather than
abandoning lawyers to the uncertainties and intellectual contortions
of conflict of law principles, 22 2 the CCBE appointed a working group
of distinguished lawyers from member states with different legal
traditions to draft a common code of conduct. 2 23 The code was
intended to supersede national codes of conduct "in relation to [the
lawyers] cross-border practice."2 2 4 Moreover, it applied only to
225
identified categories of legal professionals.
In contrast to the IBA Code, the CCBE Code explicitly claims to
be a compendium of rules not standards, stating that "[tjhe failure
of the lawyer to observe these rules must in the last resort result in
a disciplinary sanction." 22 6 Although the text itself lacks the force

220.

See CCBE COMPENDIUM, supranote 8, ch. 3, at 1.
221.
See id. ch. 3, at 2.
222.
The federal structure of the United States creates a similar problem for
lawyers who wish to deliver legal services in states where they are not licensed and
for those who are licensed in more than one state. The ABA has attempted to solve
this problem in Model Rule 8.5, a choice of law provision. I have expressed serious
reservations about the Rule's helpfulness. See Daly, supranote 174, at 715. The
comment to Rule 8.5 explicitly states: "[t]he choice of law provision is not intended
to apply to transnational practice. Choice of law in this context should be the subject
of agreements between jurisdictions or of appropriate international law." MODEL RULE
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 8.5 cmt.
223.
See Terry, PartI, supra note 12, at 5-10.
224.
CCBE CODEArt. 1.3.1, reprinted inTerry, Part , supranote 12, at 65.
225.
See CCBE, EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM AND COMMENTARY ON THE CCBE
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, reprinted in RIGHTS,
LIABILITY AND ETHICS, supra note 12, at 393-94; Terry, Part , supranote 12, at 60-87
(containing the CCBE and accompanying Explanatory Memorandum). According to
CCBE Rule 1.4, the legal professionals covered by the CCBE Code are those legal
professionals identified in European Community Directive 77/249, also known as the
"Legal Services" Directive.
See Terry, PartI, supra note 12 and nn. 67-70 and
accompanying text (listing those professionals identified in Directive 77/249 and
noting that many U.S. lawyers might be surprised by the exclusion of in-house
counsel).
226.
CCBE CODE Rule 1.2.1. For an excellent introduction to lawyer discipline
under the CCBE Code, see Terry, Part!f, supra note 12, at 345. As Professor Terry
has pointed out, however, the issue of when the CCBE Code applies is not quite as
simple as CCBE Rule 1.5 might make it appear. See generally id. at 19 n. 66 (noting
the relationship of CCBE Code Rules 1.5 and 2.4). The issue Professor Terry flags is
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of law, the CCBE Code has been formally adopted in the member
states, precisely as the CCBE intended, and now governs the "crossborder activities" of lawyers. 2 27 It consists of thirty-five detailed
rules of professional responsibility on topics as diverse as
incompatible occupations, conflicts of interest, and fee sharing with
non-lawyers. 22 8 It justifies the shift from "rudimentary rules" to
"refined and detailed rules" as necessary to "meet more complex
circumstances."2 29 Not all the rules, however, establish substantive
obligations or restraints. Some are conflicts of law provisions
designed to assist a lawyer in choosing between conflicting ethics
23 0
rules in the lawyer's home and host jurisdiction.
It would be tempting but incorrect to see the adoption of the
CCBE Code as signaling an irreversible shift from standards to
rules. The CCBE Code is clearly more rules-like than the IBA Code
in its articulation of ethical principles and by virtue of its formal
adoption by the individual member states. On the other hand, the
drafters seem noticeably uneasy with the shift.
Codes themselves, however, have limitations. They have more often
a dissuasive effect than a positive impetus. They help us to avoid
rather than to fulfill. They are attempts to capture on paper an
approved pattern of behavior, a desired moral climate, an answer to
all questions of conduct-which cannot be adequately captured on
231
paper.

Further evidence of their unease can be gleaned in the CCBE Code's
endorsement of the "[clorporate spirit of the profession," its
emphasis on the obligation of "training young lawyers," and its
encouragement of collegial resolution of disputes among lawyers23 2
each of which is more consistent with standards than rules.

whether the CCBE Code is intended as a self-contained document, exclusively
defining the cross-border activities to which it applies, or whether the CCBE Code
itself requires the application of substantive EU law in order to determine the
applicability of the CCBE Code. See id.at 357.
227. "Cross-border activities" is defined as
(a) all professional contacts with lawyers of Member States other than his
own; and
(b) the professional activities of the lawyer in a Member State other than his
own, whether or not the lawyer is physically present in that Member State.
CCBE CODE, Art. 1.5, reprintedin Terry, PartI, supra note 12, at 66.
228. See CCBE CODE Arts. 2.5, 3.2, & 3.6, reprintedin Terry, PartI, supra note
12, at 67-70.
229.

CCBE COMPENDIUM, supranote 8, ch. 4, at 9.

230. See, e.g., CCBE CODE Rules 2.5-2.6 reprinted in Terry, PartI, supra note
12, at 67-68; see Terry, PartI, supranote 12, at 7.
231. Terry, PartI, supranote 12, at 16.
232. CCBE CODE Arts. 5.1, 5.8-5.9, reprintedin Terry, Part I, supranote 12, at
73, 75. Professor Terry has concluded that there are three ways in which the CCBE
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Moreover, the adoption of the CCBE Code can hardly be labeled a
shift from standards to rules in light of the absence of the other
critical accouterments discussed earlier such as serious academic
training in legal ethics at the university level and a professional
2 33
disciplinary system that is independent of the organized bar.
In the end, the greatest contribution of the CCBE Code is the
proof it offers that lawyers from legal traditions as different as those
of the United Kingdom and Ireland, on the one hand, and France,
Germany, and Denmark, on the other, can agree on specific core
values and elaborate on their application. The CCBE Code lays the
groundwork for a subsequent code that bar regulators and crossborder practitioners around the globe would embrace. It moves the
marker on the standards/rules continuum in the civil law countries
closer to the side of the rules.
V.

CONCLUSION

As this article observed at the outset, the differences in
perception between U.S. and foreign lawyer codes of conduct is more
than simply a matter of academic interest or curiosity. It is only a
matter of time until the WTO turns its attention to the codes,
examining whether and to what extent they create illegitimate
regulatory barriers to trade in legal services. As the participants in
the Forum on Transnational Legal Practice have come to realize, if
the legal profession is to play a meaningful role in cross-border
regulation, it must seize the initiative, much as the CCBE did in
1988 with the adoption of the CCBE Code. 2 3 4 Waiting for a proposal

from the WTO is a reactive strategy with little chance of success. To

avoid being marginalized in the formative stages of WTO review, the
ABA, CCBE, JFBA, and other organized bars must come to grips

Code and the Model Rules differ with respect to their treatment of these "corporate
spirit" provisions: (1) the CCBE Code, unlike the Model Rules, has a separate section
devoted entirely to lawyers' relationships with one another; (2) the CCBE Code,
seemingly without embarrassment or dissimulation, contains provisions that appear
to protect lawyers' own interests, rather than the needs of the client or public; and
(3) the CCBE Code defines differently the person(s) to whom a lawyer owes a duty in
certain multilateral relationships. With respect to (3), Professor Terry points to CCBE
Rule 5.5, the counterpart to ABA Model Rule 4.2, regulating communications with
the opposing party. She argues that the CCBE Code characterizes the duty as being
owed to the opposing lawyer, rather than to a third person, such as the opposing
party. Professor Terry attributes at least some of these dissimilarities to the differing
conception of the role of the lawyer and "independence" in the United States and in
many civil law countries.
233.
See supra Section II.C. (discussing the rise of an emphasis on professional
responsibility in U.S. legal education).
234.
See supranotes 218-30 and accompanying text (discussing the creation
and adoption of the CCBE CODE).
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with the substantive and cultural differences in their respective
codes of lawyer conduct. They must direct their efforts first to
achieving a consensus on shared core values and second to
understanding the dichotomy between standards and rules that
divides their perceptions of lawyer codes. The first task is not an
impossible one. Here, again, the CCBE Code points the way,
demonstrating that the ethical divide between the civil and common
law countries can most often be bridged and that where it cannot,
an agreement can be reached on a conflicts of law resolution. The
second task is more complex, demanding the disentanglement of
deeply rooted understandings of the function of lawyer codes of
conduct, the mechanisms of their enforcement, their place in legal
education, and their promotion by the organized bar. In the end,
the real dichotomy is not between standards and rules but between

the perceptions of U.S. and foreign lawyers about the role of codes
of conduct.
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